SEMIOTIC MEDIATION AND MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW'S SCHOOLING

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1 In G. Wells & G. Claxton (Eds.) Leaning fo life in the 21st centuy: Sociocultual pespectives on the futue of education. Oxfod: Blackwell, SEMIOTIC MEDIATION AND MENTAL DEVELOPMENT IN PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW'S SCHOOLING Ruqaiya Hasan That childen's leaning begins long befoe they attend school is the stating point of this discussion. Any leaning a child encountes in school has a pevious histoy. (Vygotsky 1978: 84). The enomous each of Vygotsky's theoetical appoach to mental development deives fom the vey concept of semiotic mediation. What makes the concept so poweful is the fact that it establishes connections acoss some of the most impotant aeas of human social existence. Moe specifically, it foegounds a fundamental elationship between mental functions and discouse within the context of social/cultual activity. This, in tun, invites us to exploe the elations between the disciplines of psychology, semiotics and sociology. Reflection on these inteconnections suggests that if we wish to fully undestand the implications of Vygotsky's claims about the sociogenesis of human mind, then on the one hand we must be willing to ignoe the conventionally accepted boundaies eected in the name of specialisation acoss these and many othe disciplines, and on the othe hand we must be pepaed to pobe deepe into the significance of the claims made by this poweful theoy It is well ecognised (Vygotsky 1962; Wetsch 1985) that in putting fowad the concept of semiotic mediation, Vygotsky attached geate impotance to language than he did to othe modalities of meaning. We need, then, to ask why language has been ganted this special status in Vygotsky's theoy; what it is that language enables us to do which othe semiotic modalities do not -- o at least not to the same extent, o with the same facility. Similaly, in identifying social/cultual activity as the essential site fo the opeation of semiotic mediation the theoy opens up inteesting questions, such as the elation between cultual activities and language, and whethe diffeent kinds of activities encouage diffeent foms of semiotic mediation. Since the societies we know today ae plualistic, with multiple goupings whose boundaies ae dawn by efeence to inteest, ace, gende, occupation and socio-economic status, it is impotant to ask whethe the diffeent social goups engage in the same ange of activities, and if so, whethe the pefomance of such activities takes the same fom acoss the distinct social goups. If thee is an inheent elation between language, cultual activities and semiotic mediation, and if we wish to undestand the woking of semiotic mediation, then we do need to focus on such questions. It seems to me that the extent to which we can benefit fom the application of Vygotskian insights depends on how fa we ae able to engage successfully in enquiies of this kind. Nowhee does this appea tue than in the complex aea of constuctive thinking on education, both its theoy and its pactice. It is the aim of this chapte to begin an exploation of the concept of cultual activity in elation to semiotic mediation by using the Mach

2 modality of language. I hope that this exploation will eveal some impotant implications of accepting semiotic mediation as the essential means of making human minds, and thus suggest avenues fo conceptualising bette pogams fo tuly egalitaian education. Semiotic Mediation: One Pocess, Two Manifestations I shall use the tem semiotic mediation thoughout this chapte as a shot fom fo semiotic mediation by means of the modality of language. The tem semiotic efes to all modalities fo signing, not just language. In assigning this cucial place to language in the pocesses of semiotic mediation, I do not wish to pejudge the ole of othe semiotic modalities in the fomation of highe mental functions, but simply to espect Vygotsky's own usage (Vygotsky 1978; Wetsch 1985). The tem mediation on the othe hand efes to a pocess that is inheently tansitive: it equies at least two paticipants -- something/someone mediates something. So fo the puposes of this chapte the tem semiotic mediation may be paaphased as mediation of something by someone to someone else by means of the modality of language. Using the tem in this sense, I take it as axiomatic that semiotic mediation is a constant featue of human social life. The natual condition of language in use in the context of cultual activity is to mediate; the issue is not whethe it mediates, but athe what it is that it mediates. In the witings of Vygotsky and his colleagues, as well as in cuent discussions and applications, it has been customay to invoke the agency of this pocess with specific efeence to concept fomation and/o some fom of poblem solving. The concepts and poblems cited belong typically to the specialised educational activities of officially ecognised educational sites. To be sue, semiotic mediation is a poweful tool in these pocesses, but to emphasize its function only in such contexts is to encouage the questionable view that this constitutes the default function of semiotic mediation, that it epesents its tue essence, and that semiotic mediation functions only intemittently, coming into play in cultual activities which call fo explicit, delibeate teaching of specific concepts, knowledge stuctues and the like. I believe that such a view of semiotic mediation undesells the concept. In fact, to appeciate the full powe of this notion, all we need do is to emembe that semiotic mediation occus wheeve discouse occus, and that discouse is ubiquitous in the living of social life: semiotic mediation is what language natually does in discouse. And the most impotant thing that language does in discouse is to enable the speaking subjects to intenalise the wold they expeience in the living of thei life. This includes -- but also goes beyond -- the fomation of specific concepts, especially if by the tem concept we mean to efe only to technological o scientific concepts, the conscious inculcation of which is taken to be the main aim of fomal education. Seen fom this pespective, the most basic and foundational achievement -- but cetainly not the only achievement -- of semiotic mediation is the inculcation of mental disposition, that is to say, the habits of mind, tendencies to espond to situations in cetain ways (see Ca, and also Claxton, this volume), poducing in social subjects a sense of what things ae woth doing in thei community, and how they ae to be done. The claim that this is the most fundamental aspect of the development of the human mind is in keeping with Vygotsky's famewok, whee concept fomation is not a passive, eceptive pocess; athe, it involves the active paticipation of the leanes in thei leaning. By this logic, the leanes' mental Mach

3 dispositions, thei eadiness to engage in the appopiation of some concepts athe than othes, as well as the mode of negotiation they habitually bing to the leaning situation, would constitute the foundation on which the edifice of the semiotic mediation of specific concepts, and of specialised knowledge stuctues of one kind o anothe, can be eected (howeve, see below unde Concluding Remaks fo cetain impotant qualifications to this view). What this claim means is that the 'tendencies to espond to situations in cetain ways' ae as elevant in the context of educational leaning as they ae elsewhee in eveyday life. Thee ae good easons fo attending to the diffeences between these two modes of the opeation of semiotic mediation, one mode that ceates the 'habits of the mind' -- a sense of elevance which is active in the social subjects of actions and/o negotiations, funishing motivations fo engaging in them o not -- and anothe that leads to the appopiation of the elements and stuctues of specialised knowledge. I will efe to these two manifestations of semiotic mediation as invisible and visible mediation, espectively. As the label suggests, visible mediation is delibeate and elatively moe clealy focussed on some specific concept o poblem: inteactants can actually 'see' what they ae doing. Speaking cautiously, at least one of the inteactants is awae that s/he is teaching o explaining something specific to someone; futhe, an essential equiement fo success in leaning is voluntay attention and active paticipation on the pat of the leane. In this way both inteactants have a faily clea sense of the goal to be achieved. This is in contast to invisible mediation whee inteactants ae awae of neithe the teaching no the leaning of any concept in paticula, much less of any specific goal to be achieved -- o, at least, the goal uppemost in the mind is not diectly elevant to what language is mediating. The inteactants do not 'see' what is being mediated; what they 'see' is some pocess of eveyday living which funishes the occasion fo quite mundane discouse such as the following i : Extact 1.1: 1 Mothe: put it up on the stove and leave it thee 2 Kaen: why? 3 Mothe: cause 4 Kaen: that's whee it goes? 5 Mothe: yeah The nomal eaction to such discouse is that nothing is happening which could be consideed significant fom the point of view of mental activity. I will show late that this is not the case, that in fact impotant elements of mental disposition ae being mediated. This is why I have chosen the tem invisible fo such mediation. Mediation of this kind is natualised in the sense that at least one of the inteactants, the one who is aleady well vesed in the ways of he/his community, teats the sayings and thei meanings as entiely natual, as if no othe fom of behaviou is possible. The impotant fact is that othe foms of behaviou do exist within the same society: it is simply the habits of the mind that make one think othewise. Togethe these foms of semiotic mediation seve impotant puposes in the ceation of cultue on the one hand, and in pepaing social subjects to live with a lived sense of belonging to the cultue in which they ae located: the latte is of couse a condition fo the maintenance of cultue. Mach

4 Howeve, I would suggest that fom the point of view of the development of an individual, invisible mediation is pimay, both in tems of time and in tems of its pevasiveness, because it begins fom vey ealy infancy, and it occus acoss a lage numbe of cultual activities. Because invisible mediation stats ealy in life, because it is instumental in ceating 'habits of the mind', and because habits of the mind ae cucial to a subject's ways of engaging in visible semiotic mediation, it is easonable to suggest that visible mediation is not entiely independent of invisible mediation. To appeciate these points, we need to examine language as it opeates in the context of a vaiety of cultual activities. In the following sections I will discuss examples of natual, spontaneous discouse to suppot the claims I have been making. These examples ae taken fom natually occuing dialogues between mothes and thei young childen, which fomed the data base fo a sociolinguistic eseach poject I conducted with a view to examining The Role of Eveyday Talk between Mothes and Childen in Establishing ways of Leaning ii. Semiotic Mediation and Cultual Activities The two modes of semiotic mediation identified above ae typically associated with distinct contexts of cultual activities. The qualification 'typically' is impotant, because human activities vay along seveal dimensions, and these dimensions cut acoss each othe, thus ceating a lage numbe of activity types, each of which diffes fom the othes in some espect. It is not so much some specific categoy of activity that is in question but athe some specific popeties of the activities in question. Due to lack of space I will be concened hee only with two dimensions fo activity classification. Fist, thee is the dimension that I have efeed to as the sphee of activity (Hasan 1999)3 iii. Cultual activities ange fom eveyday, odinay ones to those that ae highly specialised. Eveyday activities extend ove a whole cultual community. Because of thei ubiquity, they appea entiely odinay and unemakable; in fact most ae so basic to the living of human life that we may think of them as univesal. To cite a few examples, humans eveywhee go about the business of pepaing and eating food, minding thei childen, getting thei cleaning, thei washing and shopping done, and equally impotantly they take steps to indicate that they ae membes of thei local 'village' (Lemke, this volume), though of couse the details of how they do these things vay to diffeent degees acoss cultues and subcultues. Howeve, what is in common is the fact that eveywhee the conducting of these activities becomes highly outinised, scacely equiing concentated attention. As membes of a (sub)cultue, we know how such activities ae done; eveyone aound us is doing them, and in ou tun, we too just go ahead and do them effotlessly. Even if we happen to be individualists, devoted to the vitue of oiginality, it is just not cost effective to invest time and enegy in ethinking fom the gound up how we as unique individuals should go about such activities. It is in this absence of conscious easoning about why and how one step in the activity should follow anothe, it is in this absence of the need fo elaboate planning of how an eveyday activity should be bought about, that the powe of these activities esides. Familiaity beeds invisibility: we fail to even notice that we ae engaged in any activity. By contast, specialised activities do not extend ove the whole community. One manifestation of the division of labou in society is pecisely that cetain activities ae typically pefomed by cetain social goups and not by othes. Activities of the pofessional type such as lectuing, welding, banking ae clea examples. And though in some cases, Mach

5 especially whee the activity is physical -- welding would be one example -- the vaious actions in its pefomance can become outinised, specialised activities typically equie eflection on how they ae to be pefomed: fo example, no amount of expeience in lectuing eve means that we can lectue moe o less on auto-pilot! And in all cases, the actants ae awae of the endpoint of the game they ae engaged in. Cutting acoss this dimension is the dimension of the fom of action. Hee two majo foms to note ae acting by doing -- mateial action -- and acting by saying -- vebal action. Thee ae times when the inteactants' action may be entiely mateial, i.e. it may be caied out physically, such as when mowing the lawn, o it may be entiely vebal, caied out puely linguistically, such as when talking on the phone, conducting a semina, paticipating in a talk-back adio pogam etc. But vey often both mateial and vebal actions co-occu spatio-tempoally. This co-occuence can be of diffeent kinds, and two ae paticulaly elevant to the pesent discussion, since they have diffeent significance fom the point of view of cultual activity -- one whee the vebal action is ancillay to the mateial action: that is to say, language is used in aid of pefoming the mateial activity, and the othe whee vebal and mateial action un side by side without eithe being elevant to the othe, as in discussing linguistics while having a snack. In the fist case a single cultual activity is at stake, while in the second, stictly speaking, two activities ae being pefomed in paallel, one mateial, the othe vebal. It is impotant to ecognise that in eal life as opposed to in academic analysis thee is no eadily obvious punctuation, no clealy demacated division between one activity and the next: distinct activities weave in and out of one anothe and sometime thee may be no indication of a shift fom the context of one activity to that of the othe except that povided by the language of the text. Conside the following example taken fom an inteaction between mothe and Helen (3 ys 11 mths) as they wash and dy up dishes: Extact 2.1: 1 Mothe: no, I'll wash 'em up daling, you can dy some little ones and put them [?hee] fo me, wait till I get a clean towel out.. thee you go.. 2 Helen: thank you 3 Mothe: I'll put the little ones up hee that you can dy up, OK? 4 Helen: the dish.. The dish fist.. 5 Mothe: [COUGHS] padon me.. huy up because I've got a big dinne to get tonight 6 Helen: what kind of dinne? 7 Mothe: we'll have a oast leg of ham 8 Helen: goody! 9 Mothe: and oast vegies 10 Helen: goody! 11 Mothe: I might ing up daddy and ask him to bing some peas home [?] 12 Helen: goody! 13 Mothe: he'd like a nice feed of peas 14 Helen: [? ] 15 Mothe: I think you childen can make some fuit salad, how about that? Mach

6 16 Helen: yeah, goody! I'll make it fo you In tuns 1-4 of this extact, vebal action is assisting in the conduct of the on-going mateial activity of washing up: this is the ancillay use of language, and at this point only one activity is being pefomed. Howeve, at tun 5, a shift (Hasan 2000) occus as the new topic of dinne is boached, and this shift is con/textual: that is to say, it is a shift in the text as well as in the context of the text iv. Tuns 6-16 constitute a discussion of that evening's dinne. So at this point, side by side with the on-going mateial activity of washing up, we have the vebal activity of discussion unning in paallel with the mateial activity of washing up. The activity of discussion is entiely constituted by language: the vebal action is not ancillay but constitutive of discussion. This suggests that the identity of cultual activities is not given by thei spatio-tempoal location, but by the mode of thei ealisation; if two pesons ae washing up, it does not follow that eveything that is said duing that time in that place petains to the activity of washing up. Similaly, one may begin with an eveyday activity such as getting lunch fo one's child, but end up with two paallel activities, one of getting the lunch and the othe the specialised activity of explaining about the food chain (see below). I shall etun below to the significance of con/textual shift fo semiotic mediation. In the above extact, the discussion in 6-16 moves aound in the geneal domain of things concened with food, but it is not necessay fo the two paallel activities to shae the same domain. When a constitutive vebal activity uns paallel to some eveyday mateial activity, the talk will quite often move to topics not at all elated to the on-going mateial activity. Thus it was duing one such activity of washing up that Helen and he mothe had the following inteaction. Helen was washing up a saucepan lid which appaently needed a good deal of scubbing, and the mothe was guiding Helen's washing up of the lid: Extact 2.2: 1 Helen: you have to do it had, don't you/? 2 Mothe: mm, you do, don't you, yes... 3 Helen: doesn't matte fo you and me to do these 4 Mothe: no 5 Helen: because we can do it the ight way, God teaches us 6 Mothe: no, God doesn't teach you things like that, it's mummy's job to teach you things like that The mothe's comment in the last tun It's mummy's job to teach you things like that is vey fa emoved fom the business of washing up. As an adult well vesed in the ways of he cultue the mothe is voicing one of the peceived ways of managing life in he community: she is telling he daughte explicitly about an expectation attached to being a mothe. Casual convesation abounds in such explicit aphoisms. The fleeting appeaance of an utteance of this kind, which epesents the distillation of some communal expeience, hadly eaches the point of conscious delibeate eflection, which would be typical of a sustained discussion on the same topic such as one might encounte in an educational setting. Had the inteactants been asked what they wee doing, they would have said they wee just washing up, not that one was teaching the othe about communal expectations attached to cetain social locations. Howeve, ove time, talk of this kind occuing again and again constucts a design fo ways Mach

7 of being, doing and saying that ae viewed as legitimate within the speakes' community. In this sense, such discouse is a site fo one kind of invisible semiotic mediation: what it mediates is elements of mental maps fo living in the cultue of one's immediate community. This kind of semiotic mediation typically occus in the couse of eveyday physical activities pecisely at the point whee a con/textual shift tuns the vebal action biefly fom ancillay to constitutive. Given the definition of semiotic mediation offeed above, it follows that, fo all cases of semiotic mediation, vebal action must be pesent whethe physical action is o not. Such explicit teaching, what Benstein (1990; 1996) efeed to as local pedagogy v, occus fequently especially in the discouse of adults and childen. It cetainly has an impotant place in the child's mental development, and I shall discuss some moe examples of such mediation late. But invisible mediation does not consist wholly o even lagely of obsevations and aphoisms which explicitly pesent the distilled expeiences of the community. The much moe poweful instument fo the fomation of mental habits is funished by vebal action that cooccus with eveyday physical activities, whethe this vebal action is ancillay, as in tuns 1-4 of extact 2.1, o constitutive, as in the est of that extact. The diffeence between the discussion of dinne plan in 2.1 and the aphoistic saying in extact 2.2. is simply that the latte explicitly invokes a cultual convention, wheeas the othe segments concen something puely local to the hee and now of the specific speakes. What is most elevant to the poduction of mental habits is the ways of saying and meaning, whee no cultual ules ae being explicitly enunciated. This does not mean that cultue is ielevant to these encountes; it is simply that it goes undegound: sayings of all kind depend lagely on taken-fo-ganted 'tuths' -- tuth whose basis is not contested but is teated athe as self-evident. It is this expeience of the facticity (Bege & Luckman 1971) of the wold that undelies eveyday discouse in which young childen paticipate odinaily and natually evey day of the week, evey waking hou of the day, which in its tun poduces in childen an undestanding of what thei social univese is like, what ways of being, doing, saying, and even thinking, ae favoued by those in thei immediate social goup. The appopiation of a cetain set of mental habits is not so much the esult of explicit injunctions, theefoe; athe, it is nouished by sayings which scacely seem to say anything significant -- fo example sayings of the kind pesented in extact 1.1. Eveyday activities ae the most hospitable envionment fo such sayings, because in the natue of things, eveyday activities neithe equie no allow the oppotunity fo delibeation. Thei nea automatisation, thei unquestioned, almost unquestionable ationality fo social subjects aleady initiated into the cultue leads to an absence of eflection, to the cetainty that what one is saying and/o doing is the most ational, the most nomal thing to say and do. Mental dispositions come about in the pimay expeience of intenalising the implications of meanings woded by speakes un-self-consciously in pecisely such envionments. To exemplify such talk, I quickly pesent a bief and patial account of the sot of things mothes say to thei childen while engaged in some eveyday mateial activity. Take, fo example, a mothe who might ask he child did you know that they ae going to leave? Thee is nothing extaodinay in someone utteing such a question: people ask such questions all the time, but conside with some cae what it is that the mothe has actually Mach

8 done. She hasn't asked to be infomed of some state of affais that is unfolding in the wold; she hasn't asked if something is the case in the wold. He concen is to find out the mental state of he child -- what the child knows. I have efeed to such questions as pefaced questions (Hasan 1989). Thee is a diffeence between ae they going to leave? and did you know that they ae going to leave? The latte, which is a pefaced question, asks the addessee not about what is o is not going on in the wold, but about the addessee's state of knowledge: did the addessee know something to be the case. The asking of such a question caies cetain implications: fist, it implies that knowledge about the child's mental state is not available to the mothe unless the child explicitly tells he. To many of us, this is a selfevident fact; we believe it is entiely natual fo us not to know othe people's mental state unless they choose to infom us. Howeve, below I will discuss examples (see 4.1 and 4.2) which suggest that this belief is fa fom univesal. Fo the moment, let me pusue the chain of implications following upon a pefaced question. If you happen to believe that anothes' mental state is unknowable without the use of language, this in tun implies that language would be teated as the essential bidge spanning two individual minds. That being the case, one would expect such speakes to habitually use language so as to make the meaning of thei messages as pecise as possible. In most languages, the way to do this is to qualify the state of affais, specifying its manne, location, time etc. Futhe, because language is seen as an impotant means of getting to know the othe, it follows that othes' questions must be attended to; comments and assetions must be heeded, answes should be povided that addess the quey point. In the analysis of some 2008 matenal questions and thei answes, we found that the mothes who habitually asked pefaced questions wee also the ones who asked highly qualified questions, and povided highly developed answes. Conside the following example: Extact 3.1: 1 Mothe: did you know that they ae going to leave? 2 Kisty: no 3 Mothe: they've been building a house 4 Kisty: mm 5 Mothe: oh they haven't been building it, somebody else has been building it fo them, and it's nealy finished, and they'e going to move to thei house in May 6 Kisty: why in May? 7 Mothe: they'e going to wait until the end of the school tem 8 Kisty: mm 9 Mothe: because Cathy goes to school now, and then she will change to he new school afte **the holidays 10 Kisty: **mm 11 Mothe: if they'd moved ealie she'd only go to the new school fo a week o two, and then they'd have holidays, you see, it would mess it up a bit fo he Note how the mothe is caeful to claify the sense of he claim that they've been building a house, something that at thee and a half yeas of age Kisty might well have misintepeted. Note also how in esponse to Kisty's why?, she meticulously lays out the easoning behind Mach

9 see 3 Ka 4 Mothe: you Hasan: Semiotic Mediation he fiends' decision to move to thei new house in May, not ealie. The mothes who ask pefaced and qualified questions, in thei own tun hadly ignoe the questions asked by thei childen, and ovewhelmingly offe elevant and developed answes, athe than minimal ones. Thee is significant statistical poof fom my eseach as well as that of Williams (1995) that the massive expeience of engaging in discouse of this kind poduces in the childen a paticula kind of oientation to meanings, a cetain habit of mind, a tendency to espond to questions and to infomation in ways that ae qualitatively diffeent fom those of childen whose mental habits and whose expeience of eveyday discouse is diffeent. To appeciate how diffeent the expeience of discouse is fo this othe goup of childen let us take a look at the following: Extact 4.1: 1 Kaen: how did you get that?** you didn't get out of [? ] 2 Mothe: I walked ove and got it, didn't I? Extact 4.2: 1 Mothe: d'you love daddy?... d'you love daddy 2 Julian: mm (AFFIRMATIVE) 3 Mothe: d'you love Rosemay vi 4 Julian: no 5 Mothe: why don't you love Rosemay? 6 Julian: (LAUGHS) 7 Mothe: why don't you love Rosemay? 8 Julian: (CONTINUES TO LAUGH) 9 Mothe: you'e a at-bag (REALISES THAT JULIAN WAS TEASING) 10 Julian: I do 11 Mothe: [? ] 12 Julian: who else do you want me to love? In these extacts the mothes ask what I have called an assumptive question. Such questions ae ealised gammatically by a negative inteogative. I call these questions assumptive (Hasan 1989) because the peson asking such a question, appeas to have aleady made an assumption what the coect answe ought to be. In extact 4.1, the mothe's expectation is that the answe to didn't you see me? should be yes I did, othewise you must be blind, and we know that Kaen is not blind: the mothe assumes that had Kaen been behaving accoding to nomal expectations, she would have seen he mothe go out to get the object. In extact 4.2, the mothe's question why don't you love Rosemay? assumes that, as a nomal bothe, Julian ought to love Rosemay. It does not seem fa fetched to suggest that mothes asking such questions assume they know what thei child's mental state is. Julian undestands this as is clea fom his message in tun 12, which we may paaphase as: it is clea to me by you ways of questioning that you think I should love Rosemay, this implies that you also have views on who else I should love; so who ae those people that in you opinion I should love? It is pehaps obvious that assumptive questions ae the convese of pefaced ones. If a mothe habitually asks assumptive questions, she implies that she knows he child' s mental Mach

10 state: she knows what he child knows, what s/he feels o senses. In an impotant sense the child=s answe is ielevant; the mothe aleady knows without explicitly being told. This in tun implies that language has a less citical status in the establishment of the ceation of intesubjective elations between them. Inteestingly, mothes who ae vey fequently ask assumptive questions, ae also elatively less concened about attending to thei child's question; they also put in less effot into making thei questions pecise o thei answes developed; in fact, minimal and what one might think of as inadequate answes ae quite likely, as exemplified in extacts 3.3 & 1.1: Extact 4.3: 1 Mothe: wait till Daniel comes home o daddy 2 Pete: he won't come home 3 Mothe: yes he is 4 Pete: when? 5 Mothe: he's coming home this aftenoon 6 Pete: when is it gonna be this aftenoon? 7 Mothe: yeah, he'll get it this aftenoon 8 Pete: when is it gonna be this aftenoon though? 9 Mothe: oh a long time What I am suggesting is that sayings as tite as the exchange 'why?' 'Cause' ae not without impotance in the fomation of mental attitudes. It is a commonplace that questions ae a way of finding out, but pehaps one's expeience of discouse might discouage the fomation of this attitude to questions. This eading of the extacts might povoke the comment that what we have hee is a case of ovekill, that too much is being claimed on the basis of vey little evidence. And the eaction would be justified if the case wee built only on the stength of a few isolated examples. Howeve this is not the case. Fist the extacts cited above ae epesentative of a much lage copus; futhe the main thust of the finding has been validated by esults achieved in othe elated eseaches caied out by othe colleagues1 vii. And second, the semantic featues I have picked out above fom pat of lage clustes, and thei patten of occuence tends to diffeentiate significantly the speech of the two goups of mothes. The elements of these semantic clustes ae logically/implicationally elated to each othe since a semantic featue, being puely elational, caies within itself some implication of what othe semantic featues may o may not 'easonably' and 'ationally' keep company with it without jeopadising communication. This means that the childen have a massive expeience of cetain specific ways of saying and meaning, which ae chaacteised by a paticula semantic diection. Paticipation in this discouse shapes the childen's consciousness, oients them to taking cetain ways of being, doing and saying as legitimate and easonable; in shot, it defines the contous of eality and povides a map fo navigating that eality. Thee is consistent and stong evidence that, at this ealy stage of thee and half to fou yeas, the childen belonging to these two goups have established diffeent ways of leaning, diffeent ways of solving poblems, diffeent foms of consciousness, o mental disposition. This evidence comes fom an examination of these childen's talk in thee envionments: (i) talk with thei mothes in the same eveyday envionments, (ii) thei negotiations with Mach

11 familia neighbouhood pees duing spontaneous play, and (iii) thei discouse in the classoom duing the fist few weeks afte enty into the school at aound the age of five. Tue that the pattens of language I have singled out ae vey odinay. But this, in a way, vindicates the claim that the poduction of mental disposition is bought about by the invisible semiotic mediation of un-self-conscious discouse which is embedded in eveyday cultual activities. Such discouse is odinay; and that is why it is so effective. As this pocess begins fom ealy infancy, invisible mediation which occus in the couse of eveyday activities as descibed above attains a pimay status in the life of the individual. It becomes in effect the ule of attention and inteest, of motivation and elevance. The child's ways of paticipating in the negotiation and appopiation of technical concepts o specific knowledge stuctues, etc. is coloued initially though not necessaily finally by the expeience of this pimay mediation. Befoe leaving this section, it emains to point out one vey impotant featue of this mode of semiotic mediation which is instumental in poducing pimay mental disposition. The discouse that lends itself to this function is embedded in eveyday cultual activities. These activities ae ovewhelmingly cultue maintaining, since thei efficient pefomance depends on outinisation, which means a suspension of eflection. This encouage the tendency towads peseving existing templates. Thus each of the two goups of mothes semiotically mediates pecisely the ways of being, doing and saying that come natually to them, that ae thei ways of coping with eveyday eality. Though this mediation, the mothe's cultue becomes the gowing child's map of eality, thus ensuing its own continuance. One way that this cycle of cultual epoduction can be given a diffeent shape is though the woking of visible semiotic mediation, to which I tun below. Although the sites pa excellence fo the opeation of visible semiotic mediation ae acknowledged to be schools and univesities, fo lack of space I will be concened hee only with visible semiotic mediation at home. This will allow us to see the diffeent histoies of semiotic engagement that childen bing to the school. Semiotic Mediation, Highe Mental Functions and Specialised Cultual Activities Conside the following extact that is taken fom a vey lengthy discussion between Kisty and he mothe. The oigins of this dialogue go back to an ealie scene whee Kisty was having a meal. At that ealie point, a little moth had just died a soggy death by flying low ove a steaming cup. Kisty was distessed by this death: Extact 5.1: 1 Kisty: why did he die thee?** why did he die thee?** He wouldn't have wanted to die, do you know that? 2 Mothe: that's ight, most things don't want to die 3 Kisty: mm, a dog will get killed by something that wanted to eat a doggie 4 Mothe: yeah, sometimes people want to die, o animals want to die if they ae vey sick and it's huting them 5 Kisty : mm 6 Mothe: but yeah, usually animals and people don't want to die, so - 7 Kisty: mm Mach

12 8 Mothe: eveyone has to die sometime, and sometimes people o animals have accidents 9 Kisty: mm 10 Mothe: o sometimes othe things eat them, so othe moths get eaten by bids 11 Kisty: why do they? 12 Mothe: well, bids need to eat **and - 13 Kisty: **yeah and - 14 Mothe: mm? 15 Kisty: they [? should've] eat bigge things um mice 16 Mothe: you think bids should eat mice? 17 Kisty: yeah 18 Mothe: well, you got upset the othe day about the eagle at the museum eating the abbit didn't you? 19 Kisty: mm 20 Mothe: see, thee's not much diffeence is thee? I think you just don't want the moth to get eaten do you? 21 Kisty: no 22 Mothe: well - 23 Kisty: he didn't want to die? 24 Mothe: no.. 25 Kisty: that's [?boken].. Ruth teaed it 26 Mothe: she what? 27 Kisty: teaed 28 Mothe: oh it's OK 29 Kisty: why's it OK? 30 Mothe: Pete just bought it home fo me to have a look at, but he didn't need to keep it 31 Kisty: why didn't he? 32 Mothe: oh! oh, I don't know (LAUGHS) I don't think he needed to keep it.. he'd pobably ead it aleady 33 Kisty: why he pobably ead it aleady? 34 Mothe: um, I think if he had wanted to keep it and he needed it, he would have told me to put it somewhee safe, but he put it thee which is the place whee we put stuff we don't eally cae about, that's why I think that he didn't need it, eithe he had aleady ead it o he didn't want it 35 Kisty: why did the eagle eat the abbit? 36 Mothe: because abbits ae the sot of animals that eagles eat, diffeent animals eat diffeent food, they they eat food that lives whee they can catch it and food that's the ight size fo them to catch 37 Kisty: mm 38 Mothe: an eagle couldn't eat a cow because a cow would be too big, but eagles can eat abbits, they'e a nice size fo eagles, they give them plenty to eat, and they'e small enough fo eagles to catch, but most animals eat othe animals, even you eat chickens and evey time you eat a chicken a little chicken has to die Mach

13 Thee is much moe of this discussion but we can stop at this stage of what is suely a model lesson on the gim udiments of natual selection. I would like to use this extact to daw attention to some impotant points. Fist, compae this with extact 2.2. In both cases the discussion uns paallel to some othe eveyday mateial activity, and it goes without saying that the vebal action is constitutive. Thee ae howeve some majo diffeences between them: in extact 2.2, the move into the constitutive is evanescent, hadly eceiving conscious attention, wheeas in 5.1 the constitutive activity of discussion is much moe developed. Had the mothe been asked what she was doing, vey likely she would have said that she was explaining to Kisty why evey living thing has to die some time, and how in ode fo one thing to live anothe thing might have to die. In 2.2, the aphoistic comment is a putative beginning of a specialised activity of explaining about matenal obligations, wheeas in 5.1, the activity of explanation is full fledged. This too is a case of local pedagogy, but unlike 2.2 it displays a moe delibeate and sustained effot at 'getting some point acoss' and at the same time it makes contact with a fagment of educational knowledge. In shot unning paallel to an eveyday cultual activity, we have an instance of a specialised one. This local pedagogic activity is not exactly like a lesson in a classoom, but it is as close to that activity as you can get at home, especially whee one paticipant is elatively immatue. This is a thus a classic example of visible semiotic mediation, which occus by means of discouse embedded in specialised cultual activities calling fo sustained attention by paticipants. As pointed out befoe, specialised cultual activities, unlike the eveyday ones do not extend ove the whole cultual community. Thee is an inteesting paadox hee: eveyday activities ae nea univesal, though the way they ae caied out vaies acoss diffeent communities, and in this sense, these nea univesal activities ae essentially localistic in thei manifestation. By contast, specialised cultual activities ae esticted in thei distibution within a cultue: not eveyone engages in them, though wheeve a categoy of such activity is found, the fom of its manifestation is nea univesal. Specialised activities depend fundamentally upon vebal action; and vey often, they enlist othe semiotic modalities in thei pefomance, fo example, figues, images, chats, scale models, logical and mathematical symbols, itual epesentations of supehuman foces, etc. ae instances of nonvebal semiotic modalities pessed into sevice as abstact tools fo the semiotic mediation of 'uncommonsense' concepts and knowledge stuctues. Fo most of us today, by fa the most common specialised activities ae those expeienced egulaly in schooling. At least in the so-called advanced societies, fo decades the school has been the majo official site fo the poduction and distibution of such knowledge. But it is eally at home that the ontogenesis of what Claxton (this volume) calls epistemic mentality takes its fist halting steps. Mece (this volume) pesents an example of such an inteactive episode, and my data too povides ich suppot fo making this claim. Howeve, with my colleagues, Cloan (1994, 1999) and Williams (1995, in pess), I find that the occuence of such inteactive episodes is selective: it is not childen, as a geneal categoy, but some childen belonging to a paticula goup, who typically expeience discouse of this kind -- as a compaison of 5.1 with 5.2a-c will confim. Let me tun now to anothe impotant point about 5.1; this concens the movement of the discouse: we note that at tun 25, Kisty's attention is diveted by some magazine page that Mach

14 Ruth, he baby siste, had ton up. She pobably expects he mothe to shae he concen, and as he mothe disappoints this expectation, she wants to know the eason fo the mothe's lack of concen. This sets off a chain of explanations. When Kisty's need to know has been satisfied, she tuns once again to the question of why one animal eats anothe. We note a con/textual shift at tun 25. Although the action in both cases is entiely vebal, and although this vebal action in both cases is constitutive of the activity, they belong to diffeent sphees: tuns epesent an explanation of an eveyday event, while the discouse suounding it concens themes of motality, of suvival, of life cycles of moths, and of how the life and death of each oganism in this wold impinges on the life and death of the othes: in shot, it is the stuff of specialised discouse. Extact 5.1 is epesentative of how discouse between mothes and childen moves in one goup. Time and time again in my data, the discouse of qua-si specialised knowledge occus in the 'middle of' daily activities, and by necessity it calls fo a eadiness on the mothe's pat to entetain contextual shifts, to be willing to eclassify the context of the on-going discouse (Cloan 1999; Hasan 1999, 2000). The tendency to move with the child's moving discouse, the eadiness to e-classify context is a discouse chaacteistic of the same goup of mothes who fequently ask pefaced questions made pecise by qualification, and who attend to thei childen's questions, and povide them with well developed answes. This is evident not only fom the examples povided in the section above but also fom the last extact. By contast, the second goup of mothes ae significantly less willing to entetain contextual shift. Extact 5.2 pesents one such instance: Extact 5.2a: 1 Mothe: come on, eat you tea please.. 2 Kaen: could you put some moe viii in thee?.. 3 Mothe: (WARNINGLY) Kaen!.. give me it, eat you tea 4 Kaen: [? ] 5 Mothe: mm? 6 Kaen: [?put] lemon in it 7 Mothe: well, eat some tea, o you don't get nothing 8 Kaen: I see how many [? ] thee ae (TALKS TO HERSELF AS MOTHER POURS DRINK) 9 Mothe: quick.. want the lid on it? 10 Kaen: no 11 Mothe: come on, eat you tea, less dink and moe eat.. did you hea what I said Kaen? 12 Kaen: mm 13 Mothe: well, do it As Kaen still pesists in tuning a tea-eating situation into one of imaginative play, of discussion of mattes not diectly dealing with the business of eating tea, the mothe's unwillingness to make such a shift becomes moe and moe obvious. Within a matte of seconds this same inteaction continues as follows: Extact 5.2b: 1 Kaen: mummy that haven't got no sauce on it Mach

15 2 Mothe: oh you've got plenty of sauce thee now, now eat it 3 Kaen: on hee 4 Mothe: oh thee's plenty of sauce on you plate Kaen, you don't need it on evey single dop of tea 5 Kaen: eh? 6 Mothe: you don't need it on evey little bit 7 Kaen: [? of tea]? 8 Mothe: mm 9 Kaen: is that [?tea]? 10 Mothe: that's sauce 11 Kaen: mm hot sauce 12 Mothe: no, mint sauce 13 Kaen: mince?.. why do you put mince sauce on hee fo? 14 Mothe: 'mint' not 'mince' fs22 15 Kaen: mint, this mint? 16 Mothe: use you spoon o you fok 17 Kaen: 'County Pactice' is on now? 18 Mothe: no 19 Kaen: 'Sons and Daughtes'? 20 Mothe: no, the news 21 Kaen: oh.. 22 Mothe: that's why I said use a spoon.. now sit up, and use a spoon Extacts 5.2a-b ae faily typical of this goup of mothes, who appea to have a well defined idea of the boundaies between contexts, and ae nomally eluctant to pemit the intepenetation of one context by anothe. If I undestand Claxton (this volume) ight, it would seem that the two goups of mothes belong to the two distinct cultues descibed by Edwad Hall as monochonic and polychonic cultues. Kaen's mothe belongs to the goup that, at least in this espect, may be said to have a monochonic cultue. In this twenty minute ecoding of the meal time discouse, the mothe poduces 20 injunctions to the daughte to 'eat he tea'; she studiously ignoes any opening of the discouse in diections othe than those specifically petaining to the meal time activity. In chaacteistic fashion questions ae disposed of with an alacity that misses thei eal quey point (see fo example the mint/mince discussion); and the mention of the TV soapies County Pactice and Sons and Daughtes eceives shot shift! But does this mean that in such cases, thee is no con/textual shift, no eclassification of context at all? As Benstein (1990) peceptively emaked, the maintenance of the bounday between categoies equies the exetion of powe and contol. Ou example hee is no exception. Elsewhee I have claimed (see Hasan 2000) that the context does shift, but the diection of its shift is quite pedictable: in ode to peseve what she consides to be the boundaies of this activity, Kaen's mothe's discouse moves esolutely into the egulative mode, as shown by extact 5.2c which occus some 3 seconds afte extact 5.2b: Extact 4.2c: 1 Mothe: give me you spoon, and I'll feed you, like a big baby, come on, baby! give me you spoon Mach

16 2 Kaen: (SCANDALISED TONE) no 3 Mothe: well sit up popely, and eat you tea.. Kaen! (WARNING TONE) 4 Kaen: I'm falling down (i.e. OFF THE CHAIR) 5 Mothe: you'e not falling down 6 Kaen: yes I am, I always fall down..**i am falling down 7 Mothe: **eat you tea 8 Kaen: I am falling down 9 Mothe: sit up, befoe I get a stick and smack you If con/textual shift is an invaiable condition fo moving fom the quotidian to the specialised discouse at this ealy stage in the child's life, clealy the eluctance to allow such shifts is likely to have significant consequences fo the ontogenesis of specialised discouse. Tuning to a elated point, in my data, childen's discusive style was not distinguished by the kind of questions they asked. Thus, quite often they will seek explanations, as did Kisty, but the esponse the second goup of childen eceive is makedly diffeent fom the sot of easoning favoued in specialised discouse. Conside the following, whee the mothe is putting Sam to bed (Valentine is Sam's pet budgeiga): Extact 5.3: 1 Mothe: he can hea you when you say 'Goodnight Valentine' 2 Sam: whee is he? 3 Mothe: in the kitchen 4 Sam: what's he doing in thee? 5 Mothe: he's going to sleep 6 Sam: huh? 7 Mothe: and mummy's going to tun the lights out 8 Sam: why? 9 Mothe: it's dak 10 Sam: why? 11 Mothe: it's night time, it's eady fo bed 12 Sam: why? 13 Mothe: cause it is, when you wake up in the moning we'll have ou beakfast If the pimay mental disposition is fiendly to an un-self-conscious pesevation of the cultual templates, as I agued above, one question is what ae those templates like, and whee would thei pesevation take those pactising subjects? The extacts I have pesented suggest that the cultual templates fo the two goups ae significantly diffeent, and they ae significantly diffeent paticulaly fom the point of view of what they imply in the context of schooling. The final section consists of a bief wod on the implications of this situation and offes a suggestion fo an appoach to schooling that might go some way towads the ideal of equal oppotunity. Schooling fo Tomoow: Concluding Remaks In the peceding two sections I have attempted to show that "any leaning a child encountes in school has a pevious histoy." It seems to me beyond doubt that this histoy favous Mach

17 childen diffeentially in today's industialised plualistic societies. The pe-school leaning histoy of the fist goup of childen favous an easie engagement with the specialised discouses of the school; by contast, fo those of the second goup, it favous easie adjustment to the egulatoy aspect of the pedagogic discouse. To the extent that the eal aim of education is to enable pupils not to epoduce knowledge, but to poduce it, not simply to eplicate but to ceate, this appeas to place the fist goup in an advantageous position. Educational systems claim to povide equal oppotunity fo all to acquie the competence fo engaging in specialised activities; but this emains an ideal goal, as yet neve achieved in eality, anywhee. It would be a simplification of the complexities of the educational system to claim that the only eason it fails to achieve its ideal goal is the diffeential leaning histoy of the pupils; but that this is one majo eason fo the schools' failue cannot be denied. To accept this is not to imply that the leaning the child bings to the classoom is final, that the foms of consciousness, the mental dispositions ae gaven images which ae no longe susceptible to the vey instument of semiotic mediation which has poduced them in the fist place. As complex self-oganising systems, human bains lean by leaning; thee is as Wells (this volume) points out a spial of leaning. But an initial effot is equied to ceate a situation in the classoom which ecognises the natue of the challenge to daw all childen into the activity of leaning. The challenge is that those fo whom the educational system is ostensibly designed bing many voices into the classoom; howeve, even a cusoy look at classoom pactices eveals that it pivileges one single voice. This happens to be the voice of the moe poweful segment of the society. Those who do not ecognise this voice, cannot tuly paticipate in the specialised discouse of knowledge poduction, and must stive on thei own to maste this othe epistemic dialect. In the continuation of my eseach, in which these childen wee followed into the fist yea of schooling, we found that acoss the spectum of schools the teaches showed no significant vaiation in thei ways of saying: the vaiation in the data was totally accounted fo by the diffeence in how the childen talked duing lesson time. The challenge fo tomoow's education is to coect this situation. And one way of achieving this is to encouage pupils to question the taken-fo-ganted ealities. By this I mean both the eality cheished by the mothes of the fist goup as well as that cheished by the second goup. It is often pointed out that in the classoom it is the teache who asks questions; I have no objection to this situation so long as the teache knows how to espect answes -- to espect them to the extent of actually involving thei pupils in eflecting on the assumptions that undelie the answes, and involving the child in aticulating those assumptions, thus making them available fo conscious eflection and questioning. This eflective mode has the potential of questioning all voices, listening to all voices and pobing into all assumptions. A pogamme of this kind is what I descibed some time ago unde the label of eflection liteacy (Hasan 1996). But to be able to encouage eflection liteacy those who educate teaches need to ethink the inteconnections between the semiotic, the social and the cognitive. Refeences: Bege, P. & Luckman, T The Social Constuction of Reality: A Teatise on the Sociology of Knowledge. New Yok: Doubleday. Benstein, Basil Class, Codes and Contol, Volume 1: Theoetical Studies towad Mach