Hospitals and the Proposed Virginia Medicaid Expansion. By Marc D. Joffe and Jason J. Fichtner

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1 Hospitals and the Proposed Virginia Medicaid Expansion By Marc D. Joffe and Jason J. Fichtner April 2015

2 Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy The Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy is a non-partisan research and education organization devoted to improving the lives of the people of Virginia. The Institute was organized in Virginia in 1996 and, at that time, was the only state and local government focused public policy foundation based on a philosophy of limited government, free enterprise and individual responsibility in the state. It is a solutions tank seeking better ways to accomplish the policies and programs currently being undertaken by state and local government always based on the Institute s underlying philosophy. The work of the Institute is geared toward educating our political, business and community leadership to the issues facing our society here in Virginia. The Institute offers suggested solutions to the problems facing our commonwealth in a non-partisan manner. The Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy is a fully approved foundation by the Internal Revenue Service. It is designated a 501 (c) 3 organization and contributions are tax-deductible under the law. Individuals, corporations, foundations and associations are invited to contribute to the Thomas Jefferson Institute and participate in our programs. For more information on the programs and publications of the Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy, please contact: Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy 9035 Golden Sunset Lane Springfield, Virginia / This paper, Hospitals and the Proposed Virginia Medicaid Expansion does not necessarily reflect the views of the Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy nor its Board of Directors. Nothing in this study should be construed as an attempt to hinder or aid any legislation.

3 Foreword Although the expansion of Medicaid has been defeated in the Virginia General Assembly, the advocates of Obamacare and for expansion of Medicaid under this program vow to keep this issue alive. Last September the Thomas Jefferson Institute published a study that showed the profit and loss and net worth of the acute care hospitals here in Virginia. That report was published because the largest business group supporting Medicaid expansion was the hospitals. They said they needed Medicaid expansion because their financial health required it. This study highlighted the financial health of our hospitals and let the readers draw their own conclusions. This report can be found here: And today the hospitals continue to be the major advocates outside of government for a major expansion of Medicaid. And that will likely continue to be the case. The Washington Post on March 16, 2015 ran an article about the shaky financial health of rural hospitals in our country. That is also the case here in Virginia. Most of the hospitals that are in a difficult financial situation here in the Commonwealth are the small, rural hospitals. This study by Marc Joffe and Jason Fichtner highlights the most current financial standing of Virginia s hospitals as available at the Virginia Hospital Information website. And it shows that, overall, our hospitals are doing very well. And yet, as these authors point out, the smaller rural hospitals are indeed the ones in trouble and they point out that public policy might indeed want to help these health care facilities. The authors maintain that expanding Medicaid is not the best way to help these hospitals. It would be better, these authors argue, for our state to spend more on these hospitals directly rather than expand Medicaid. This study shows how the for-profit and non-profit hospitals are doing financially. The overall net income for the for-profit hospitals was $243 million in 2013 (see page 4) and for the nonprofit hospitals the net income was over $1 billion in 2013 (see page 6). And the authors also highlight the compensation that the top administrators and doctors are making in Virginia s nonprofit hospitals (pages 8, 9 and 10). Medicaid is already the fastest growing part of our state budget. And the way that the law is crafted, it tells the states that if they expand Medicaid, the federal government will pay 90% of the cost for the expansion of this major entitlement program. But it can really do so? Earlier this year, I attended a briefing with Congressman Paul Ryan who now chairs the United States House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means. In that briefing, Congressman Ryan made is very clear that the proposed expansion of Medicaid could not continue at the i

4 promised 90% and that the cost for expansion will have to be reduced to match the current payment structure for the rest of Medicaid. That is basically a 50% federal payment and 50% state payment. This means that any expansion of Medicaid in Virginia will end up being extraordinarily expensive. This is not the first time the federal government has promised to pay new costs for a federally mandated program. The 1975 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) imposed new conditions on local school systems to provide students with disabilities with a free, appropriate public education. The American Association of School Administrators has pointed out that the law proposed that federal funds should cover up to 40% of the excess cost of educating students with disabilities. Today, the federal government covers less than 16 percent of those costs. Those who trust promises on Medicaid might consider the record on IDEA. This study is published by the Thomas Jefferson Institute in order to show that the hospitals in Virginia are, overall, doing pretty well financially. The hospitals that are the main nongovernment advocates for Medicaid expansion are not in financial difficulty. This study is provided as a public service so that the debate over health care in general and Medicaid expansion specifically can take place with facts in front of our elected leaders and others interested in this important issue. This study is not meant to support or oppose any specific legislation and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Thomas Jefferson Institute or its Board of Directors. Michael W. Thompson, Chairman and President Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy April 2015 ii

5 Hospitals and the Proposed Virginia Medicaid Expansion By Marc D. Joffe and Jason J. Fichtner 1 The debate over Medicaid expansion under the provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) often revolves around its impact on low income, uninsured adults. But Medicaid does not only benefit enrollees; it also benefits various groups of medical providers. Indeed, Medicaid payments are made directly to hospitals and other providers. Hospitals thus have a financial incentive to support Medicaid expansion in Virginia and elsewhere. After providing some evidence that Virginia hospitals are acting on this incentive, we consider whether they should receive additional taxpayer funds through Medicaid. We find that hospitals have traditionally acted on the belief that they have an obligation to provide care for economically disadvantaged patients and that today s not-for-profit hospitals are expected to fulfill this traditional obligation in return for the benefits that derive from their not-for-profit status. Further, we find that by and large - hospitals can afford to provide this charity care without increased Medicaid subsidies. Hospital Support for Medicaid Expansion Of the $7 billion the Virginia Medicaid program pays to providers, about $1.5 billion is remitted to hospitals. It is expected that these facilities would receive a significant share of additional Medicaid payments if the program is expanded. For example, a 2013 Robert Wood Johnson study estimated that Virginia hospitals would receive an additional $600 million in 2016 if the state implemented Medicaid expansion. 2 For this reason, hospital administrators are major supporters of Virginia Medicaid expansion. In 2013, the Virginia Hospital & Healthcare Association (VHHA) Political Action Committee donated $39,000 to Terry McAuliffe s gubernatorial campaign and only $13,500 to that of Ken Cuccinelli. 3 The PAC s largest House of Delegates beneficiary was Thomas Rust the only Republican delegate to vote for Medicaid expansion when it was raised in February VHHA also commissioned a study from Chmura Economics & Analytics 5 that concluded: The Medicaid expansion can inject new money into Virginia s healthcare industry, provide cost savings for Virginia businesses, and increase household spending for those newly insured. Consequently, the Medicaid expansion can generate more Virginia jobs and tax revenue (p. 4). 1 The authors wish to thank Anna Mills for her contributions to this research. 2 Stan Dorn, et. al., The Financial Benefit to Hospitals from State Expansion of Medicaid (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, March 2013), 3 Author s calculation from Virginia State Board of Elections, Campaign Finance Reports, n.d., The disparity may be partially explained by the phenomenon of campaign contributors focusing their support on the likely winner, as discussed by Dennis Mueller, Public Choice III (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 4 Michael Laris and Laura Vozzella, House and Senate in Virginia at Loggerheads over Medicaid Expansion, Washington Post, February 20, 2014, in-virginia-at-loggerheads-over-medicaid-expansion/2014/02/20/7bdf47f0-9a3d-11e3-b c514b_story.html. 5 Chmura Economics and Analytics, The Economic Impact of the Medicaid Expansion on Virginia s Economy, December 7, 2012, 1

6 Hospital association lobbying on behalf of Medicaid expansion can best be understood in terms of Bruce Yandle s Baptists and Bootleggers construct. 6 Yandle concluded that new regulations have the strongest chance of succeeding when they are supported by two distinct groups: true believers and interest groups that can profit from the intervention. The colorful name for this theory stems from the Prohibition era when Baptists (who ardently believed in the benefits of temperance) and Bootleggers (who could profit from alcohol prohibition by driving out legal distributors and thereby gaining pricing power) found themselves on the same side. Although Yandle proposed the theory to explain regulation, it has since been applied to other areas of rent-seeking behavior, such as subsidies. In 2007, Michael Cannon, health care expert at the Cato Institute, described an alliance of healthcare access advocates and healthcare provider lobbies supporting expansion of the State Children s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). 7 This alliance is once again at play in Virginia, where hospitals and other providers join with advocacy groups such as the labor union supported Virginia Organizing to lobby on behalf of Medicaid expansion. A possible objection to the Bootleggers and Baptists analogy is that hospital administrators deserve far more respect than liquor smugglers. Health care might be viewed as a necessity and service to the public welfare, while alcohol viewed as a guilty pleasure. But the simple fact that a lobbying group is providing an essential service does not imply that such a group won t attempt to extract rents (excess returns) for its work. And, when a provider group seeks to extract rents for its service, it is reasonable for academic researchers to identify its rent seeking behavior. A further objection is that most hospitals operate as not-for-profits creating the presumption that management is primarily motivated by non-pecuniary concerns. We will question that presumption below, and offer evidence that many not-for-profit institutions offer their stakeholders opportunities for financial gain. Charity Care and Medicaid: Some Historical Perspective Charity care the provision of medical services to the poor regardless of their ability to pay has a long tradition. For example, charity care is listed among a physician s professional duties in the American Medical Association s 1847 Code of Medical Ethics. 8 In 1932, the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care found that the very poorest Americans used hospitals as frequently as the wealthiest Americans, because of the availability of charity care. At that time, a combination of pro bono services, philanthropic donations that supported the operations of sectarian hospitals and public hospitals funded by local governments provided the poor with free or reduced cost access to medical facilities.9 Federal involvement in hospital finance began after World War II and greatly increased with the 1965 passage of Medicare and Medicaid. But even with federal funding, the expectation that hospitals would provide charity care remained. In 1986, Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) requiring all Medicare-participating hospitals to provide emergency services regardless of ability to pay. Virtually all hospitals in Virginia participate in Medicare Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect, Regulation 22, no. 3 (October 1999): Michael F. Cannon, Sinking SCHIP: A First Step toward Stopping the Growth of Government Health Programs, Cato Briefing Papers, September 13, 2007, 8 Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association: Originally Adopted at the Adjourned Meeting of the National Medical Convention in Philadelphia, May, 1847 (Chicago: American Medical Association Press, 1900). 9 Jonathan Engel, Poor People s Medicine: Medicaid and American Charity Care Since 1965 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 10 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), March 2012, 2

7 This background suggests that access to hospital care for the economically disadvantaged has not been a matter of debate. Instead, the question is one of whether taxpayers should bear a larger burden of the charitable care historically provided by hospitals. One criterion for making this policy choice is hospitals ability to pay: when adults earning less than 133 percent of the federal poverty line (the income ceiling for the proposed Medicaid expansion in Virginia) come to the emergency room, can hospitals afford to treat them? Hospital Income To assess whether hospitals can afford to provide charity care, we can review their income statements. In Virginia, hospital financial and operating data are collected by Virginia Health Information (VHI), working under contract with the Virginia Department of Health. 11 VHI publishes a Hospital Detail Report and various Industry Reports on an annual basis. These data sets may be purchased from VHI, although some of the information is freely available on VHI s web site at VHI s current Industry Review contains 2013 financial data for 101 hospitals. VHI data do not include Veterans Administration Hospitals, but do include a broad range of facilities including acute care, rehabilitation, psychiatric and children s hospitals. Table 1 provides summary data for the hospitals in the VHI data set. Table 1: VHI Summary Data Number of Hospitals Number of Admissions (2013) 2013 Net Income Number with Positive Net Income Number with Negative Net Income For Profit ,455 $ 243,150, Not-for-profit ,585 1,027,763, Government 5 76, ,338, Totals ,025 $ 1,536,251, Source: Virginia Hospital Information, Hospital Reports 2013 and Author's calculations. 11 For more information about VHI, please see Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Health Information, 2010, and Virginia Health Information, From Numbers to Knowledge: VHI 2013 Annual Report and Strategic Update, 2013, 3

8 In aggregate, Virginia hospitals reported strong financial results, with revenues exceeding expenditures by almost $1.5 billion, representing a return on income of roughly 8%. Hospitals in all three ownership categories for profit, private not-for-profit and government reported positive net income. 12 That said, some individual hospitals sustained operating losses. Most of these money losing facilities are smaller hospitals with less than 100 staffed beds. For Profit Hospitals For profit hospitals account for over 20 percent of admissions in the VHI data set. The biggest private hospital company in Virginia is Hospital Corporation of America, which operates hospitals in several states and trades on the New York Stock Exchange as HCA Holdings, Inc. (symbol HCA). The company reported close to $1.6 billion in net income in But this number understates the profitability of HCA s hospitals, since some of the profits are distributed to minority interests when HCA owns less than 100 percent of a given hospital. When net income attributable to non-controlling interests is included, HCA hospitals reported aggregate net income of $2.0 billion. 13 Between January 1, 2012 and December 31, 2014, HCA s shares more than tripled, substantially outperforming the S&P HCA has not only performed well for its owners; company executives have also benefited. According to company proxy materials, CEO Richard Bracken received $16.5 million in total 2013 compensation, while the next four highest paid executives received a total in excess of $20 million averaging $5 million each. 15 HCA is not the only profitable hospital company operating in Virginia, as shown in Table 2. Table 2: Virginia For-Profit Hospitals by Corporate Parent Company (Ticker Symbol) Number of Virginia Hospitals (2013) Virginia Hospital 2013 Net Income Total Corporate Earnings (2013) Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) 10 $ 206,288,855 $ 1,556,000,000 HealthSouth (HLS) 6 11,791, ,600,000 LifePoint (LPNT) 6 27,969, ,800,000 Community Health Systems (CYH) 3 (2,138,407) 141,203,000 Universal Health Services (UHS) 3 (78,583) 510,733,000 Other For-Profit 2 (682,391) Totals 30 $ 243,150,288 Source: Virginia Hospital Information, Company 10-K Filings 12 The Thomas Jefferson Institute reported Virginia hospital income and net worth in a September 2014 study entitled The Financial Health of Virginia s Hospitals available at 13 HCA Holdings, Inc., Annual Report to Stockholders, 2013, file/hca_2013_annual_report.pdf. 14 Yahoo Finance: HCA Holdings, Inc 15 HCA Holdings, Inc., Proxy Materials, March 14, 2014, Statement/2014/4/23/t.aspx?t=XNYS:HCA&ft=DEF%2014A&d=e8d1d3cb d9895df2e24a0ed2f. 4

9 Four other companies operate multiple Virginia hospitals. Two realized subsantial positive net income from their Virginia hospitals, and all of them had substantial profits at the corporate level in both 2012 and Although earnings declined in 2013, Virginia appears to remain an attractive market to for-profit hospital operators, as evidenced by LifePoint s November 2013 acquisition of a majority stake in Warrenton, VA s Fauquier Hospital. 16 We have no quarrel with corporate profits per se, nor do we advocate government controlling executive pay. We raise the issues of profits, stock performance and executive compensation to make the simple point that these hospital chains do not need the additional subsidies that Medicaid expansion would provide. Profiting from Not-for-Profit Hospitals The term not-for-profit evokes a vision of an organization operating for the public good rather than private benefit. But the distinction between not-for-profit and for-profit corporations is less clear than the terminology suggests. Not-for-profit hospitals can and do run surpluses. 17 According to VHI financial data, Virginia s 66 private, not-for-profit hospitals had aggregate net income of $1.028 billion in Many Virginia hospitals are members of large health systems that often operate across state lines. Table 3 (next page) shows the performance of the eight not-for-profit health systems that operated at least three hospitals in Virginia in All eight of the not-for-profits recorded revenues greater than expenditures on their Virginia hospitals in 2013; and they all reported revenues greater than expenditures system-wide on their most recently published financial statements. Despite the lack of Medicaid expansion thus far, two systems have expanded operations in Virginia recently. In March 2014, Novant Health opened Haymarket Medical Center, a 60-bed community hospital in northern Virginia. Novant Health operates a total of 15 hospitals in four states including Prince William Medical Center in Manassas, VA. 18 Meanwhile, in February 2014, Bon Secours Health System announced plans to take over Rappahannock General Hospital in Kilmarnock, VA Fauquier Health, Fauquier Health / LifePoint Hospitals Partnership: Building a Healthier Future Together., 2013, 17 The literature contains a number of studies that explore the convergence of not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals and question whether not-for-profits provide community benefits sufficient to justify their status. See, for example, Guy David, The Convergence between for-profit and Nonprofit Hospitals in the United States, International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 9, no. 4 (December 2009): ; David P. Gehant, Are Non-Profit Hospitals Doing Enough to Justify Their Exemptions? A Comparative Analysis., Doctoral Project (Medical University of South Carolina, 2008), and Congressional Budget Office, Nonprofit Hospitals and the Provision of Community Benefits, December 2006, 18 Novant Healthcare, Novant Health Announces Opening of Haymarket Medical Center, Potomac Local News, March 28, 2014, 19 Tammie Smith, Bon Secours to Acquire Rappahannock General in Kilmarnock, Richmond Times Dispatch, February 12, 2014, 5

10 Table 3: Not-For-Profit Hospital Groups in Virginia Number of Virginia Hospitals (2013) Virginia Hospital 2013 Net Income Group-Wide Excess of Revenue over Expenses (2013) Sentara Healthcare 12 $ 211,636,360 $ 606,412,000 Bon Secours Health System 7 122,209, ,850,000 Carilion Clinic and Subsidiaries 7 170,251, ,984,000 Riverside Health Care Association 8 50,713,000 5,360,000 Inova Health System 5 160,435, ,468,000 Mountain States Health Alliance 5 5,687,794 59,567,000 Valley Health System 4 19,896,120 18,597,000 Centra Health 3 46,425,139 59,963,787 Other Private Not-for-Profit ,508,370 Total 66 $ 1,027,763,136 Sources: Virginia Health Information, Form 990 Filings and Audited Financial Statements. From an economic standpoint, the distinction between for profit and not-for-profit organizations is that the latter do not have an obvious residual claimant. When a for-profit firm realizes profits, these residuals belong to the company s shareholders. Management, acting as an agent for shareholders, may decide to retain and reinvest the earnings, rather than distribute them as dividends but the profits clearly belong to the company s owners. In the case of a privately owned, not-for-profit hospital group, excess revenues are not the property of any individual or set of individuals. However, the fact that excess income at non-profit hospitals does not legally belong to anyone, does not mean that they cannot be used for individual benefit. For several decades, economists have studied residual claimants at not-for-profit hospitals. In a 1973 American Economic Review article, Mark Pauly and Michael Redisch theorized that physicians enjoy de facto control of not-for-profit hospitals and they use their power to maximize their practice incomes. Pauly and Redisch conclude that physician control will result in hospitals of smaller than optimal size, because incumbent physicians have an incentive to restrict the number of new doctors permitted to admit patients to the facility Mark Pauly and Michael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians Cooperative, The American Economic Review 63, no. 1 (March 1973):

11 The emergence of multi-facility health systems has given rise to a class of hospital administrators who may have supplanted physicians since Pauly and Redisch published their findings in A Compdata salary survey reported in the New York Times found that the average hospital administrator earned more than the average general practitioner, while the average hospital CEO received $386,000 in cash compensation plus substantial non-cash benefits. 21 The story quotes Cathy Schoen of the Commonwealth Club (in New York City) as follows: At large hospitals there are senior V.P.s, V.P.s of this, that and the other each one of them is paid more than before, and more than in any other country. While we urge caution in criticizing the organizational and compensation policies of not-for-profit hospital groups, we question whether further taxpayer subsidies are required to support these practices. Not-for-profit organizations are required to list executive compensation in their annual IRS reports using IRS tax Form 990, which is roughly analogous to Form 1040 but requires much more information. The IRS publishes scanned images of these reports and several organizations display them on the internet. 22 We collected the most recently available Forms 990 mostly reflecting 2012 data - from these web sites and reviewed executive compensation levels. These highly compensated executives are listed in Table 4. Over 100 additional not-for-profit hospital executives with Virginia connections were awarded between $500,000 and $1,000,000 in total compensation according to the latest available reports (which are mostly from 2012 and 2013). High compensation is not objectionable per se. Firms operating in a competitive environment without taxpayer subsidies may determine that highly paid executives add sufficient value to justify their compensation. But Virginia hospitals and health systems operate in a highly regulated environment and receive a substantial portion of their revenue from governmental sources. Thus, it is possible that high executive compensation levels include economic rents as well as residual claims on the excess income of their institutions. It is also appropriate for the public and policymakers to consider these compensation levels when taxpayers both in Virginia and across the nation are being asked to increase the support they provide to these institutions. With respect to subsidies, it is also worth noting that not-for-profit hospitals receive benefits from their status as charitable organizations. Among these benefits are the ability to receive tax deductible contributions, exemptions from income, property and sales taxes, and the access to tax-exempt bond financing (tax-exempt bonds pay lower interest rates than taxable bonds with similar risk and maturity dates). 23 Until 1969, not-for-profit hospitals were explicitly required to provide charity care to be eligible for tax exemption. This conditionality was weakened by IRS Revenue Ruling , which allowed non-profits to retain their tax exemptions if they provided any of a broader set of community benefits Elisabeth Rosenthal, Medicine s Top Earners Are Not the M.D.s, New York Times, May 17, 2014, 22 Form 990 internet repositories are available from Guidestar, Propublica, PublicResource.org, CitizenAudit.org and the National Center for Charitable Statistics. 23 See William Gentry and John Penrod, The Tax Benefits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals (National Bureau of Economic Research, February 1998), and Virginia Department of Taxation, Retail Sales and Use Tax Exemptions for Nonprofit Organizations, July 2014, 24 Helen Schneider, Paying Their Way? Do Nonprofit Hospitals Justify Their Favorable Tax Treatment? Inquiry 44, no. 2 (Summer 2007):

12 Table 4: Not-For-Profit Hospital Executives with Total in Excess of $1,000,000 8 Reportable from the Organization Reportable from Related Organizations Other from Organization and Related Organizations Total Employer Name Title Novant Health Inc. Paul M. Wiles Former CEO $11,115,042 $0 $27,210 $11,142,252 Sentara Healthcare David L. Bernd CEO/Director/Trustee 4,981, ,749 5,308,603 Sentara Healthcare Howard P. Kern COO/President 3,731, ,594 4,454,291 Inova Alexandria Hospital J. Knox Singleton President 0 3,538, ,863 4,182,970 Mountain States Health Dennis Vonderfecht CEO 3,163, ,698 3,206,445 Alliance Novant Health Inc. Carl Steven Amato CEO & President 1,665, ,133,054 2,798,348 Inova Health Care Services Mark Stauder COO 0 1,949, ,322 2,502,640 Novant Health Inc. Stephen L. Wallenhaupt EVP Chief Medical Officer 1,678, ,557 2,443,079 Bon Secours Health System Richard Statuto CEO/President 2,187, ,522 2,358,792 Novant Health Inc. Gregory Beier Former EVP & President 1,968, ,704 1,999,984 Novant Ops Carilion Services, Inc. Nancy Howell Agee President/CEO/Director 1,124, ,490 1,962,487 Centra Health George W. Dawson Former CEO 1,873, ,669 1,876,015 Inova Health Care Services John Niederhuber CEO, ITMI 0 1,748,456 53,427 1,801,883 Children's Hospital of the King's James D. Dahling President/Director 0 919, ,712 1,764,680 Daughters Novant Health Inc. Fred McDowell Hargett EVP & Chief Financial 1,072, ,816 1,704,286 Officer Novant Health Inc. Jacqueune Rene Daniels EVP & Chief 1,072, ,604 1,654,234 Administrative Officer Bon Secours Health System Peter Bernard EVP - CEO VA Health 1,438, ,966 1,631,047 System Novant Health Inc. Lawrence Upchurch Senior VP & General 1,074, ,213 1,575,830 McGee Counsel Sentara Healthcare Michael M. Dudley Sr VP 905, ,683 1,565,894 Carilion Medical Center Gary Simonds MD Physician 1,376, ,789 1,458,642 Sentara Healthcare Gary R. Yates MD Sr VP/CMO 1,281, ,648 1,454,391 Novant Health Inc. Ann Unersallye EVP & Chief Clinical Officer 1,090, ,277 1,399,282

13 Table 4: Not-For-Profit Hospital Executives with Total in Excess of $1,000,000 Employer Name Title Reportable from the Organization Reportable from Related Organizations Other from Organization and Related Organizations Total Sentara Healthcare Robert A. Broermann CFO/Treasurer 1,203, ,076 1,389,395 Novant Health Inc. Diana Lee Best Senior VP 921, ,295 1,385,710 University of Virginia Mark A. Stoler MD Physician 1,213, ,983 39,322 1,376,697 Physician's Network Carilion Medical Center Jonathan Carmouche MD Physician 1,339, ,203 1,367,812 Riverside Healthcare William McAllister Physician 1,309, ,947 1,342,627 Associaton Riverside Healthcare Dean Kostov Physician 1,299, ,871 1,313,628 Associaton Novant Health Inc. Derrick Mark Billings President, NH Shared 265, , ,889 1,290,412 Services Inova Alexandria Hospital Richard Magenheimer Treasurer 0 980, ,965 1,281,026 Inova Health Care Services James Eklund Physician 1,188, ,625 1,260,270 Bon Secours Health System Timothy Davis EVP-CHRAO 1,122, ,895 1,257,179 Carilion Medical Center Joseph Moskal MD Physician 1,202, ,126 1,248,932 Carilion Medical Center Nicholas Qandah MD Physician 1,222, ,900 1,243,079 Novant Health Inc. Tony W Johnson Senior VP 845, ,180 1,234,143 Bon Secours Health System Markon Prest, MD EVP-CMO 1,039, ,468 1,197,933 University of Virginia Irving L. Kron MD Co-Vice Chair of the 544, ,488 67,906 1,189,071 Physicians Group Board Maryview Hospital Mark B. Kerner MD Physician 1,148, ,611 1,184,617 Mary Washington Healthcare Glen I Poffenbarger MD Neurosurgeon 1,138, ,260 1,178,750 Group Sentara Medical Group Bill W. Berry Jr. MD Physician 1,119, ,787 1,178,087 Novant Health Inc. David G. Park Senior VP 816, ,856 1,168,185 The Fauquier Hospital Rodger Baker President/CEO 1,087, ,527 1,159,579 Incorporated Riverside Healthcare Richard Pearce Exec Vice Chairman 1,108, ,592 1,142,188 Association Bon Secours Health System Matthew Toddy EVP & General Counsel 1,014, ,512 1,130,660 9

14 Table 4: Not-For-Profit Hospital Executives with Total in Excess of $1,000,000 Employer Name Title Reportable from the Organization Reportable from Related Organizations Other from Organization and Related Organizations Total Carilion Services, Inc. Donald Lorton Assistant Treasurer 0 756, ,047 1,109,798 Riverside Healthcare William Downey President, CEO RHS 1,068, ,496 1,106,783 Association Bon Secours, DePaul Medical John R. Baker, MD Physician 1,067, ,334 1,105,241 Center Rockingham Memorial Hospital James D. Krauss President 950, ,048 1,096,494 Wellmont Health System Margaret Denarvaez President 1,031, ,176 1,079,057 Bon Secours Health System Michael Kerner CEO-BS Hampton Roads 936, ,770 1,069,695 Health System Martha Jefferson Hospital Kenneth H. Karkaur Board Member 0 979,254 84,563 1,063,817 Sentara Healthcare Kenneth M. Krakaur Sr VP 979, ,563 1,063,817 Carilion Medical Center Cay Mierisch MD Physician 1,001, ,129 1,058,677 Novant Health Inc. Robert H. Seehausen Jr. Senior VP 629, ,521 1,037,463 Bon Secours Health System Mark Nantz CEO - St. Francis Health 952, ,530 1,032,634 System Novant Health Inc. Jim George Tobalski Sr VP Mkting/Comm & 984, ,775 1,028,352 Gov Affairs Sentara Healthcare Mary L. Blunt Corp VP 0 848, ,487 1,022,904 Inova Health Care Services Marshall Ruffin Chief Technology Officer 0 854, ,975 1,017,212 Inova Health Care Services Loring Flint Chief Medical Officer 0 834, ,304 1,015,194 Bon Secours Health System Samuel Ross, MD CEO-BS Baltimore Health 938, ,328 1,014,451 System Mary Washington Healthcare Glenn J. Poffenbarger MD Physician 975, ,786 1,014,364 Group Riverside Healthcare Robert Cullom Physician 1,004, ,062 1,005,898 Association University of Virginia John A. Kern MD Physician/Professor 793, ,426 38,614 1,001,355 Physicians Group Source: IRS Form 990 Filings 10

15 Government (Public) Hospitals Medical centers operated by governmental entities are not a major component of the Virginia hospital scene. Of the six facilities in this category, four are operated by public universities: University of Virginia and Virginia Commonwealth University. The largest of these facilities are teaching hospitals with substantial operating margins and the ability to leverage the services of interns and residents at low cost. As appendages of large universities, these hospitals may be expected to have more in common with private not-for-profit medical centers. In fact, the physicians at UVA and VCU are employed by private, 501(c)3 physician groups. Two UVA physicians are on the list of not-for-profit hospital employees earning over $1 million annually in Table 4. Virginia does not have large urban public hospitals like Bellevue Hospital in New York or Grady Memorial Hospital in Atlanta that would normally be expected to have unusually high concentrations of uninsured and Medicaid patients. That said, patients in these categories are not distributed uniformly across Virginia hospitals, as we discuss below. Disproportionate Share Hospitals and Hospital Closures Although privately-owned Virginia hospitals are performing well in the aggregate, individual results vary. Hospitals in less affluent areas admit a greater proportion of uninsured patients and Medicaid beneficiaries. Uninsured patients often do not pay their hospital bills, while Medicaid provider payments are generally lower than rates paid by Medicare and private insurers. In 1981, Congress authorized special payments to so-called Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) those that care for an unusually large share of uninsured and Medicaid patients. 25 Nationally, a number of rural hospitals have shut down since the beginning of In Georgia, four such hospitals closed, 26 while Vidant Pungo Hospital in Belhaven, North Carolina closed in July 2014 after a planned takeover by the city of Belhaven failed to materialize. 27 Finally, in Pennington Gap, Virginia, Lee Regional Hospital a recipient of Medicaid DSH funding - closed on October 1, Some ACA supporters have attributed recent hospital closures to the states failure to participate in Medicaid expansion. Their premise is that the Affordable Care Act reduced DSH payments as an offset to the additional Medicaid reimbursements hospitals would receive from expansion. When certain states, including Virginia, declined to expand Medicaid they put their marginal hospitals at risk. As Tara Culp- Ressler wrote at ThinkProgress: Providers that serve a high number of poor and uninsured Americans, technically called Disproportionate Share Hospitals, often operate on a loss because their patients can t always pay for their care. To compensate, the federal government offers reimbursements for those hospitals but the Affordable Care Act changes the way the payments are structured. Because the health law intended every state to expand Medicaid, and therefore reduce the number of uninsured people who 25 Alison Mitchell, Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 26 Andy Miller, Another Rural Hospital Closed, Albany Herald, February 15, 2014, 27 Even with Pungo Hospital Closed, Town Looks at Options, WITN 7 News, July 1, 2014, 28 Wellmont to Close Virginia Hospital, Points to Obamacare, Patient Loss, September 11, 2013, 11

16 can t pay their bills, the reimbursements for DSH hospitals have been reduced. But if hospitals are located in states that continue to refuse Obamacare s Medicaid expansion, that puts them in a difficult spot. They re losing out on some of the federal government s funding without making up the difference with an influx of insured patients. 29 When Wellmont Health System announced the closure of Lee Regional Medical Center it cited reimbursement cuts associated with the Affordable Care Act as one of the reasons for shutting down the facility 30 - echoing Culp-Ressler s narrative. However, these statements do not comport with the facts. The original Affordable Care Act legislation phased in DSH reductions starting in FY The cut for that year was supposed to be $500 million nationally 31 about 4.4 percent of the $11.4 billion of DSH allotments in FY So, Lee Regional had not been impacted by DSH reductions when Wellmont decided to close it. 32 Further, Congress has subsequently passed two bills that delay the Medicaid DSH reductions, and they are now not scheduled to begin until FY Consequently, no recent hospital closures can be accurately attributed to state s failure to offset DSH reductions since none have occurred. 34 It is also worth noting that Virginia receives a relatively small amount of Medicaid DSH funds. In FY 2012, the state s hospitals were allotted only $90 million of the $11.4 billion apportioned nationally. 35 Thus, Virginia was allotted 0.8 percent of the national total, although the state accounted for 2.6 percent of US population in Finally, DSH allotment cuts if and when they occur - will not be proportional across states. The law directs the Secretary of HHS to make greater cuts in states that have the lowest percentages of uninsured individuals. 37 These states are unlikely to include those that have declined the Medicaid expansion. If DSH reductions fail to explain the closure of Lee Regional and several out-of-state hospitals, what does? It is more likely that the closures are part of a long-term decline in rural hospitals rather than a new phenomenon. According to the HHS Inspector General, 208 rural hospitals closed between 1990 and Most of the closures were the result of consolidations or failure of low utilization facilities. On 29 Tara Culp-Ressler, A Rural Hospital Is Closing In Tennessee Because The State Refuses To Expand Medicaid, ThinkProgress, April 30, 2014, 30 Wellmont to Close Virginia Hospital, Points to Obamacare, Patient Loss. 31 Mitchell, Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments. 32 Further, VHI data indicates that Lee Regional did not receive a Disproportionate Share Hospital payment in Public Law delayed the DSH reductions to FY 2016, and Public Law further delayed the reductions to FY The latest version of the affected statute, Section 1923(f) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4(f)), can be found at 34 In addition to Medicaid DSH, CMS also operates a Medicare DSH program. Hospital reimbursements under this program are also being reduced in accordance with Section 3133 of PL , The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. However, according to the HHS Actuary, this provision had no impact through FY 2013 and only $110 million nationally in FY See Richard S. Foster, Estimated Financial Effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as Amended (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, April 22, 2010), 35 Medicaid Program; Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotments and Institutions for Mental Diseases Disproportionate Share Hospital Limits for FY 2012, and Preliminary FY 2013 Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotments and Limits, Federal Register, July 26, U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Virginia, 2014, U.S. Code 1396r 4(f)(7)(A)(i)(I) 12

17 average, the hospitals that closed had a daily census of ten patients of which five were Medicare beneficiaries and only one was a Medicaid beneficiary. 38 Low utilization is also a factor in the more recent closures. 39 A 2009 analysis of 32 Georgia Critical Access Hospitals (CAH) found an average occupancy rate of only 25 percent. 40 The four Georgia hospitals that closed since early 2013 were all CAHs which are eligible for special federal subsidies and must be limited to 25 acute beds. In 2011, Kaiser Health News profiled a Louisiana CAH in which fewer than four of the hospital s 25 beds were occupied on an average day. 41 According to Virginia Health Information 42, Lee Regional Medical Center had a percent staffed bed occupancy rate in This rate was the fourth lowest among the 73 general hospitals 43 in VHI s 2012 acute hospital data set, which had a median occupancy of percent. So it is fair to conclude that low occupancy was also a major factor in Wellmont s decision to close this facility. More generally, the VHI data set shows a statistically significant correlation (p <.01) between hospital utilization rates and their total margin (i.e., net income as a fraction of total revenue). In other words, more highly utilized hospitals tend to be more profitable. There is also a statistically significant correlation (again at p <.01) between the number of staffed beds and total margin. This is an intuitive outcome since hospitals have some level of fixed costs. The bigger the hospital, the more beds across which these costs may be divided. 44 Policy Options In free, competitive markets, suppliers that attract fewer customers are more likely to fail. Even though the hospital industry is highly regulated and subsidized, we see much the same outcome. Small, low utilization hospitals struggle and are sometimes obliged to shut down. It is possible to avoid this phenomenon by increasing subsidies to Critical Access Hospitals and other small medical facilities. Policymakers may choose this option despite its apparent inefficiency in response to a belief in universal service availability. Just as the nation has many under-utilized post offices in small towns owing to a common belief in the importance of universal access to mail service, it may be deemed appropriate to have small, uneconomic hospitals in rural areas in the belief that everyone should be near a hospital. Medicaid expansion is an inefficient way to achieve the goal of keeping small, rural hospitals open, because most of the additional funding will go to larger, profitable hospitals that can readily afford to 38 Janet Rehnquist, Trends in Rural Hospital Closure (Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services, May 2003), 39 In theory, Medicaid expansion could expand utilization, but the more likely affect would be to shift some charity care admissions to Medicaid-eligible admissions. The core problem of low utilization would thus remain. 40 Draffin & Tucker, LLP, Critiical Access Hospital Financial Analyses , June 2010, 20Fiscal%20Analysis%20-%20Phase%20III.pdf. 41 Jenny Gold, When Critical Access Hospitals Are Not So Critical, Kaiser Health News, December 8, 2011, 42 Virginia Health Information, Hospital 2012 Worksheet, Industry Reports (Richmond, VA, 2013). 43 The overall VHI data set includes a total of 89 facilities: 73 general hospitals, 7 critical access hospitals, 6 long term acute care hospitals and 3 children s hospitals. Three of the 16 specialized facilities had lower occupancy rates than Lee Regional in Regression analysis was performed on the 2012 VHI data set. The 2013 data we reviewed did not include the number of staffed beds. 13

18 provide charity care. Instead of further expanding the margins of these larger facilities, policymakers should consider focusing incremental expenditures on those hospitals most at risk of closing. This could best be done outside the context of the Medicaid program. Conclusion Most Virginia hospitals are profitable, and many can afford to provide their executives with generous compensation packages. They thus do not require Medicaid expansion to provide care to economically disadvantaged Virginians. The voluntary provision of charity care has deep roots in medical ethics and hospital development. Further government involvement in charity care involves subsidizing profitable investor-owned hospital companies as well as many large not-for-profit hospitals and health systems that earn revenues well in excess of their costs. Some Virginia hospitals are experiencing financial distress most often because they have insufficient volume to cover their fixed costs. If policymakers prefer to avoid mergers and closures among these low utilization facilities, they can support these hospitals directly rather than providing untargeted hospital subsidies through Medicaid expansion. About the Authors Marc D. Joffe founded Public Sector Credit Solutions in 2011 to educate policymakers, investors and citizens about government credit risk. His research has been published by the California State Treasurer s Office, the Mercatus Center and the Macdonald-Laurier Institute among others. His op-eds have been featured in The Guardian, The Fiscal Times and other publications. Prior to starting PSCS, Marc was a Senior Director at Moody s Analytics. He has an MBA from New York University and an MPA from San Francisco State University. Jason J. Fichtner serves as an adjunct professor at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the Virginia Tech Center for Public Administration and Policy, where he teaches courses in economics, public finance, public policy process, public management, and public budgeting processes. Previously, he served in several positions at the Social Security Administration, including as deputy commissioner of social security (acting), chief economist, and associate commissioner for retirement policy. He also served as senior economist with the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress. His work has been featured in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, Investor s Business Daily, the Los Angeles Times, the Atlantic, and USA Today, as well as on broadcasts by PBS, NBC, and NPR. 14

19 Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy Board of Directors Michael Thompson: Chairman and President: For 25 years Mr. Thompson owned his own marketing company. He has been very active in national, state and local politics as well as a number of state and community organizations, commissions, and committees. Randal C. Teague: Secretary/Treasurer/Counsel: Chairman of the Fund for American Studies and retired Partner in the law firm of Vorys, Sater Seymour and Pease, Mr. Teague is a noted international attorney. John Alderson: President of the John Alderson Insurance Agency. William W. Beach: Chief Economist, Senate Finance Committee, United States Senate. James W. Beamer: Managing Dir. for Legislative Outreach at Dominion Resources Services. Stephen Cannon: Partner, Constantine Cannon, PC, former Sr. VP of Circuit City Stores. Stephan Cassaday: President, Cassaday and Company Rebecca Donatelli: President, Campaign Solutions/Connell Donatelli James W. Dyke Jr: Senior Advisor, McGuireWoods and former VA Secretary of Education. B. Keith Fulton: VP for Mid-Atlantic Region, Verizon. John Hager: Former Lt. Governor of Virginia. Robert L. Hartwell: President, Hartwell Capitol Consulting. Alan I. Kirshner: Chairman and CEO of Markel Corporation. Joseph Ragan: Founder and President of Joe Ragan s Coffee. John Rust: Former State Delegate and Partner, Rust and Rust law firm. John Ryan: Former Senior Counsel and Director of Gov t Affairs for Bristol Myers Squibb. Robert W. Shinn: President of Public Affairs, Capitol Results Dr. Robert F. Turner: Law professor at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville.

20 a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities. Thomas Jefferson, 1801 Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy 9035 Golden Sunset Lane Springfield, VA