Reading Group Issues in Theoretical Linguistics

Reading Group Issues in Theoretical Linguistics Andrea Bellavia Friday 25th May, 2012 Feldman, Jerome. 2006. From Molecule to Metaphor: A Neural Theory of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Chapter 16: Metaphor and Meaning. 1 Background 1.1 Conceptual Metaphor Theory From Lakoff (2005): Metaphors We Live By was written in 1979, before the era of brain science and neural computation (also see Lakoff, 1993). Nonetheless, certain results from that era have stood the test of time: Metaphors are conceptual mappings; they are part of the conceptual system and not mere linguistic expressions. There is a huge system of fixed, conventional metaphorical mappings. The system exists physically in our brains. Certain metaphors are grounded via correlations in embodied experience (e.g., more is up is grounded via the correlation between quantity and verticality you pour more water in the glass and the level goes up). Metaphorical mappings are typically across conceptual domains (as in affection is warmth). Mappings operate on source domain frame and image-schema structure. Via metaphorical mappings, source domain structures (image-schema and frame structures) are used for reasoning about the target domain. Indeed, much of our reasoning makes use of conceptual metaphors. Metaphorical language makes use of conceptual metaphors. Many different linguistic expressions can express some aspect of the same metaphor. event structure metaphors: the verb to cause has two syntactic valence structures that correspond to two conceptual metaphors > two syntactic correlates (Lakoff & Johnson 1999): I caused the vase to fall - causation as a forced movement I caused pain to a great many people - causation as a transfer of an effect to an affected entity Causative construction: I warmed the milk to body temperature. grammar of: causation as a forced movement 1.2 The Mistery of Embodied Language From Feldman (2006; Chapter 1): Concrete words and concepts directly label our embodied experience. Think of such short words in English as knee, kick, ask, red, want, sad. Spatial relations, for example, concepts expressed by words such as in, through, above, and around, can be seen as derived from specialized circuitry in the visual system: topographic maps of the visual field, orientationsensitive cells. 1

What is technically called aspect in linguistics the way we conceptualize the structure of events, reason about events, and express events in language appears to stem from the neural structure of our system of motor control. Abstract thought grows out of concrete embodied experiences, typically sensory-motor experiences. Much of abstract thought makes use of reasoning based on the underlying embodied experience. Thought and language are thus very strongly shaped by the nature of our bodies, our brains, and our experience functioning in the everyday world. What this means is that any approach to an embodied theory of language requires mechanisms of neural computation used for other purposes and adapted to thought and language detailed structures in the visual system, the motor system, and basic neural learning mechanisms. This has profound consequences: Thought and language are not disembodied symbol systems that happen to be realized in the human brain through its computation properties. Instead, thought and language are inherently embodied. They reflect the structure of human bodies and have the inherent properties of neural systems as well as the external physical and social environment. Because language is complex, linguists have traditionally broken its study artificially into levels or modules given names such as phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, the lexicon, semantics, discourse, and pragmatics. Most linguists specialize in the study of just one level or at the border between two adjacent subfields. Such focused studies have told us a great deal about language and are still the norm. However, real language is embodied, integrated, and multimodal. The rules or patterns of language are called constructions, and these integrate different facets of language. 1.3 A Neural Theory of Language An NTL does more than just provide a neural implementation of standard theories of thought and language. Rather it permits a more accurate and full account of our thought and language and the way they fit together. In particular, it allows the embodied and neural character of thought and language to take center stage. The neural theory of language described in this book helps us characterize the integrated, embodied nature of language. The following example illustrate what this means. Spinning Your Wheels The phrase spinning your wheels (like hundreds, if not thousands, of other motivated idioms in English) illustrates the multimodal nature of language. As an idiom, it is like a word of English; you have to learn it, and what you know about it does not follow from general rules. The words involved in the idiom (spin and wheels) have images that fit the salient part of a cultural image (a car spinning its wheels) with knowledge about the image (no motion, desire for motion, lots of effort, frustration). And the common metaphorical meanings make use of maps from this frame-andscene semantics to various abstract domains (purposeful actions, careers, love relationships). To know how to use spinning your wheels correctly, you need to have integrated knowledge involving at least grammar (the constructions), lexicon (the words), semantics (identity of the subject and the pronoun), a cultural image and associated knowledge, and standard conceptual metaphors. There must be precise linkages across all these modalities: the ing has to fit on the same verb (spin) that (a) precedes the noun phrase in the verb phrase construction, (b) has an image that fits into the wheelspinning- on-a-car image, (c) is part of the cultural knowledge associated with the image, which entails lack of motion. Also, the lack of motion can stand as the base of at least three different metaphors: lack of progress in an activity, lack of advancement in a career, and lack of development in a relationship. The remarkable fact is that these metaphors are productive we can apply them in novel situations and will be understood. 2 Metaphor and Meaning 2.1 Introduction (199-200) There is now very strong evidence that essentially all of our cultural, abstract, and theoretical concepts derive their meanings by mapping, through metaphor, to the embodied experiential concepts we explored in earlier chapters. Elaborate systems of structural mappings link all domains of knowledge to the primitive schemas [...]. Much of the 2

reasoning we use in thinking about complex and abstract subjects derives from our basic embodied knowledge of actions, goals, forces, and so on. 2.2 Primary Metaphors (200-202) Metaphor systems are grounded in the body in terms of primary metaphors. An experience brings together a subjective judgement and a sensory-motor experience. Such correlations show up in language. I will follow the standard terminology and call the sensory-motor activity the source domain and the subjective experience the target domain of the metaphor. Largely universal, primary metaphors provide the grounding for much of the metaphor system. From the neural perspective, primary metaphors can be seen as a normal consequence of associative learning. Neurons that fire together, wire together. When subjective and sensory-motor experiences are brought together in an episode, both domains are coactive. This, according to association learning theory, causes the strengthening of connections between the neural circuits supporting the different modalities. The new, strengthened connections physically constitute the metaphorical mapping. It is important that the modalities remain distinct (it is still possible to experience one without the other). 2.3 Learning Primary Metaphors (202) In Metaphors We Live By, Lakoff and Johnson hypothesized that certain very basic conceptual metaphors arose from correlations in everyday experience. This hypothesis was confirmed in research on child language learning. In a study of the acquisition of the knowing is seeing metaphor, it has been found that children first learn the literal sense of see as in See doggie and See Daddy. Then they learn cases referred to as conflations, in which the domains of seeing and knowing are coactive, that is, both are involved, as in sentences such as: See Daddy come in, or See what I spilled. Finally, children learn pure metaphorical cases such as: See what I mean. Metaphor arises from such conflation, or neural coactivation, in everyday experience of the source and target domains of the metaphor. The cases he studied occurred before the age of 3 years. 2.4 Conceptual Metaphor and Abstract Concepts (202-206) Complex metaphors are conceptual combinations of primary metaphors. Each primary metaphor is directly grounded in everyday experience linking our (often sensory-motor) experience to our subjective judgments. For example, the primary conceptual metaphor Affection is warmth arises because our earliest experiences with affection correlate with the physical experience of the warmth of being held closely. The primary metaphors appear to be learned mainly to help the child understand and express language about subjective experience. But they also provide a mechanism for conceptualizing and discussing the full range of cultural and abstract concepts needed in human society. The metaphor mechanism also interacts with our capacity for organizing experience into the frames. Metaphors usually map between conceptual frames (e.g., journey and career) rather than just relating two isolated words. A child s early experiences involve various entities that play fundamental semantic roles such as agent, goal, source, and time. There is evidence that basic grammatical forms are based on the structure of these primary experiences. Metaphors are selective mappings [...]. Much of cognitive linguistics is concerned with exactly how this works. 2.5 causes are forces (Force Dynamics; Talmy 1985, 2000) Causation is metaphorically based on our embodied use of force in everyday life. Causes are forces is a primary metaphor, learned automatically and subconsciously in early childhood. (1) The noise gave me a headache 3

(2) The aspirin took it away (3) The democrats blocked the balanced budget amendment in the senate All of these sentences express causation but not the same concept of causation. We do not have a single concept of causation, but many, each with different inference structures. The central metaphor is causes are forces. It combines with other metaphors to yield complex causation concepts. Causation is embodied, mapping back to the everyday experience of exerting force. Complex metaphors (e.g., the event structure metaphor) could arise neurally because primary metaphors can be coactive. Connections between the coactive maps can give rise to circuits connecting the maps and allowing for their repeated coactivation. The causes are forces metaphor combines with several other metaphors to produce a general mapping between physical journeys and any goal oriented activity, however abstract. 2.6 The event structure Metaphor (207-212) The event structure metaphor combines several primary metaphors and organizes them in a complex way. It also relies on the common frame semantics of motion or journeys, which include the various source domain concepts such as locations, movements, paths, and forced movements. Causes are forces. States are locations (bounded regions in space). Changes are movements (into or out of bounded regions). Actions are self-propelled movements. Purposes are destinations. Means are paths (to destinations). Difficulties are impediments to motion. External events are large, moving objects. Long-term, purposeful activities are journeys. The metaphor is not in the linguistic expressions but in the concepts. This mapping generalizes over an extremely wide range of expressions. For example, consider states and changes. We speak of being in or out of a state, of going into or out of it, of entering or leaving it, of getting to a state or emerging from it. This is a rich and complex metaphor whose parts interact in several ways. difficulties are impediments to motion difficulties: blockages, features of the terrain, burdens, counterforces, and lack of an energy source. Overwhelming empirical support for the existence of the event structure metaphor. And the existence of that metaphor shows that some common abstract concepts time, state, change, causation, action, purpose, and means are conceptualized via metaphor. Since such concepts are at the very center of our conceptual systems, the fact that they are conceptualized metaphorically shows that metaphorical mappings are linked to our core ideas. Each conventional metaphor, that is, each mapping instance, is a fixed pattern of correspondences across conceptual domains. As such, each mapping defines an open-ended class of potential correspondences across inference patterns. When activated, a mapping may apply to a novel source domain knowledge structure and characterize a corresponding target domain knowledge structure. Once a domain of knowledge becomes well known, it can itself serve as a source domain (basis) for understanding more novel concepts (much of the power of metaphor comes from the ability to activate novel conceptual linkages). Metaphorical mappings should not be thought of as processes, or as algorithms that mechanically take source domain inputs and produce target domain outputs. Each mapping should be seen, instead, as a pattern of neural connections across domains that may or may not evoke a source domain knowledge structure. In general,. The remarkable fact is that we automatically carry over the crucial inferences from the source (embodied) domain to the usually more abstract target domain. 4

Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (Invariance Hypothesis) 2.7 General Observations The event structure metaphor is extremely rich. How can it be represented neurally and how would it arise? The theory of primary metaphors at the beginning of this chapter is an account of how the metaphors might originate. The claim is that the brain uses structures it has, such as the rich, detailed networks for sensory-motor concepts (Figure 16.1 action is motion related to a sentence like France stumbled into recession), and adapts them to other things, such as abstract concepts. If metaphorical mappings are embodied like this, we should be able to do psychological experiments on them. Experiment Gibbs (1994): In one study, subjects were first asked to read little stories about anger. Lexical decision task: decide as fast as possible whether some string of letters is an English word. They were given three different kinds of sentences as priming contexts (priming is believed to work by spreading activation among related neural representations): (4) He blew his stack (appropriate idiom) (5) He got very angry (literal) (6) He saw many dents (neutral control phrase) The target strings were either metaphorically connected words like heat, unrelated words, or nonwords. When primed by (4), subjects responded faster for heat, but not for unrelated words or nonwords, even though sentence 1 has no direct mention of anything involving heat. Explanation: metaphorical sentence like (4) evokes the mapping from anger to heat and thus makes it faster for people to identify the string heat as an English word. Abstract domains really do derive their meaning from metaphorical mappings, usually to domains of direct experience. 3 Topics for discussion 1. As a first point for discussion, I will show a violation of the Invariance Principle to better explain it (fundamental in conceptual mappings since it is the hypothesis that ensures the preservation of the cognitive topology of the source domain into the target domain). 2. The embodied approach entails several crucial questions. How much, and in exactly what ways, are thought and language products of our bodies? How, exactly, does our embodied nature shape the way we think and communicate? 3. Are Conceptual Metaphors evidence for the embodied nature of language? 4. Primary Metaphors as basic conceptual mappings for more specific ones? Are primary metaphors universal? Any parallelism between basic metaphoric and basic sense meaning in Prototype Theory? Could this parallelism be advanced as a claim to assert that language is governed/motivated by the general cognitive operations at different levels of organization? 5. Can the basic sensory-motor concepts be considered as semantic primitives? 6. Is the description of the network of node activation (p. 205) enough to advance a Neural Theory of Metaphor/Embodied Language? What is missing? And the experiment briefly mentioned at the end of the chapter? 5

References [1] Feldman, Jerome. (2006). From Molecule to Metaphor: A Neural Theory of Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [2] Gibbs, Raymond W. 1994. The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [3] Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [4] Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1999. Philosophy in the Flesh. New York: Basic Books. [5] Lakoff, George. 2005. The Neural Theory of Metaphor. In Gibbs, R. W. (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6