PROJECT GUTS Session 1: Friendship and Cooperation INSTRUCTOR HANDBOOK We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately. Benjamin Franklin Session One: 3.5 hours, including breaks Part One: Social Science 20-30 minutes: Read/Discuss: The Challenge of Cooperation 30 minutes: Activity: Prisoner s Dilemma 30 minutes: Graphing and Small Group Presentations (Break) Part Two: Computing 10-15 minutes: Activity: Red or Green? game 15-20 minutes: Intro to NetLogo (Prisoner s Dilemma model) 10 minutes: Model: Voting 15 minutes: Watch/Discuss: PBS video Emergence 20 minutes: Modeling: Build Painted Turtles model 10 minutes: Watch/Discuss: Video Golden Balls Supplies: Laptops Projector Large graph paper Markers or sharpies For Prisoner s Dilemma Deck of cards Decision Sheet 6- sided die Tickets Hat or container for matching partners Strips of paper with ID numbers for matching partners Student Handouts: The Challenge of Cooperation Prisoner s Dilemma instructions Prisoner s Dilemma decision sheet The Prisoner s Dilemma and Social Dilemmas Models Prisoner s Dilemma, Voting, and Painted Turtles Videos Emergence Golden Balls http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/emergence.html http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0qjk3twze8
PAGE 2 INSTRUCTOR HANDBOOK Read/Discuss: The Challenge of Cooperation (20-30 minutes) Guide a discussion regarding the main points in The Challenge of Cooperation. Below follow some suggested prompts. What is friendship and why study it? What does it mean to feel close to a person? How are friends treated differently than people who are not close friends? Activity: The Prisoner s Dilemma (30 minutes) Students are introduced to both the trade- offs that underlie cooperation in social dilemmas and the ways in which decisions to cooperate are influenced by whether or not one can be selective about one's partner. Students will play the game three times, each time with different variables. Pass out student materials: Two playing cards (one red and one black) Round 1 Instructions Numbers for partner matching Write payout structure on the board Game 1: Students play eight rounds of Prisoner's Dilemma. Partners are randomly matched each round. No talking. Game 2: Students are matched randomly, but this time they keep their partners for a random number of rounds. No talking. Game 3: Students can talk and select their partners each round. Calculate total points per game and distribute a ticket to the two high scorers in each game (6 total tickets).
INSTRUCTOR HANDBOOK PAGE 3 Graphing and Small Group Presentations (30 minutes) Have students graph the following data on large wall Post its or on the board. 1) The average payoff for each round in game 1 2) The average payoff for each round in game 2 3) The average payoff for each round in game 3 After reading The Prisoner s and Social Dilemmas handout together, in small groups, students discuss one of the questions below and, while engaging with the recently graphed data, write their ideas on a sheet of paper or large post- it. Each group briefly presents their thoughts on their question. What types of strategies did different people use? Did you behave differently in each of the three rounds? Did changing the game change how people played with their partners? Why do you think there were different/similar payoffs in each of the games? How might the discussion prior to the activity have influenced the results? Activity: Red or Green? Game (10-15 minutes) Students close their eyes and choose a color (red or green) to begin. While the students keep their eyes closed, the leader counts how many students begin with each color (students raise their hand for each color for initial count). Students open their eyes and walk around, whispering the color to four other students, and keep track of the responses. If the results are 3/1 of the opposite color, then the student should change color and continue to play, re- examining results and changing color (if necessary) after each 4 encounters. After 3-4 minutes, leader asks students close their eyes and counts the colors again. Continue to play and determine if pattern emerges. If time, add in switch if tie (i.e. Switch the color if results are 2/2 after four encounters).
PAGE 4 INSTRUCTOR HANDBOOK Intro to NetLogo/Prisoner s Dilemma Students open Prisoner s Dilemma model (NetLogo models library, social science, unverified). With the group, introduce coding aspects of NetLogo (interface, buttons, switches, speed slider). Run experiment with prisoner s dilemma model. (15-20 minutes) Model: Voting (10 minutes) Examine Voting model (NetLogo models library). Discuss NetLogo features of the model and run experiments with different settings, discussing how results vary from our red- green game. This is an opportunity to discuss computer modeling how models differ from reality, what is omitted or assumed, what the model tests, where the model is better than reality (more flexible, more perfect, easier to use) or worse (unrealistic, based on too many assumptions). Watch/Discuss: Emergence (15 minutes) Watch PBS Emergence (through crowd scene, 4:50) and discuss the use of models to study Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS). What is the purpose of modeling? What are the assumptions or abstractions? What are the differences between the red- green game and the voting model? Modeling: Build Painted Turtles model (20 minutes) Build painted turtles in NetLogo. Guide the students practice with students working individually or pair programming in teams of two. Discuss similarities & differences between StarLogo TNG & NetLogo, reasons for modeling, relationship of modeling to Science of Friendship topics. Watch/Discuss: Golden Balls (10 minutes) Students watch YouTube excerpt from the British television show Golden Balls and observe one player s unusual strategy of split or steal (similar to Prisoner s Dilemma).
INSTRUCTOR HANDBOOK PAGE 5 Extensions: The NetLogo models library has a number of Prisoner s Dilemma models. There models can be accessed through the NetLogo program and used to spotlight how agent based models study such phenomena as the evolution of cooperation. These models also serve as a great introduction to NetLogo. Online sources: A news article about a Prisoner s Dilemma study conducted with prisoners. http://www.latimes.com/news/science/sciencenow/la- sci- sn- prisoners- dilemma- cooperation- 20130725,0,4705696.story Watch remainder of PBS Emergence video
PROJECT GUTS Student Handouts STUDENT HANDBOOK We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately. Benjamin Franklin Background: The Challenge of Cooperation solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" is how 17 th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes described human life without civilization. He may have exaggerated his case, but there s some truth to it. This world can be tough, and to get by, we often need help from others. But finding good help isn t as easy as asking for it. You cannot simply walk up to a stranger on the street and ask if she will help you with your homework or chores. Well, you could, but you can be pretty sure that you ll be washing the dishes by yourself. Strangers do occasionally help each other in emergencies, but in many cases people are more likely to help people they know. Why? Offering help to the wrong people can put you into a vulnerable position a position of being taken advantage of. Imagine someone asking you to borrow money (a fairly direct form of help). If you lend money to this person, you re at risk of never seeing your money again. Another good reason people are more likely to help someone they know is that they don t know if a stranger would ever help them. That is, if the roles were reversed and the stranger came up to you and asked for help with yard work, would you help them when the time came? In this world, to receive help you often have to give help. This challenge the challenge of needing help but not wanting to be taken advantage of is something that all animals that cooperate have to deal with. Human beings have developed some unique and interesting ways to handle this problem. Researchers and scholars have proposed that one solution is to have friends. Although this is a seemingly simple solution, it s more complicated than it appears. What is friendship, how does it come about, and exactly how does friendship help to solve this fundamental problem of vulnerability in cooperation?
UNIT 1: THE SCIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP PAGE 7 Background: The Prisoner s Dilemma The Prisoner s Dilemma and Social Dilemmas We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately. Benjamin Franklin The Prisoner s Dilemma has been used over the past 50 years to study how people and other animals help each other and cooperate when there is a risk that they might be exploited. It has been used to study how markets work, how animals reproduce and, how nations agree to work together on issues like climate change or nuclear disarmament. The Prisoner s Dilemma is just one example of a more general class of situations called Social Dilemmas. These are situations where choices that would be best for the group may be different than those that are best for an individual. When social scientists run experiments to see how people behave in the Prisoner's Dilemma, they have shown that many factors can influence how much people cooperate. People cooperate more when they are likely to play with the same partner again, when other people can see their decisions, when players can communicate, and when people can be punished for not cooperating. The Prisoner's Dilemma captures a very simple conflict between the benefits from cheating and the benefits from cooperating. For that reason, it has been used to study the evolution and emergence of cooperation in humans and other organisms. To see what strategy works best when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma with the same partner for several rounds, in the 1980s researchers at University of Michigan ran a series of tournaments between different computer programs which played each other in the "repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." The computer program which got the biggest payoff was called Tit- for- Tat. Tit- for- Tat simply cooperates on the first round, and then copies the decisions of its partners in all following rounds. Since these early tournaments, how strategies play out over time in competition with each other has played a big part in the study of the evolution of cooperation. Vocabulary Game theory: A framework for studying strategic decision making when outcomes for one person are dependent not only upon his/her choices but the choices of others as well. Prisoner s Dilemma: Classic game in game theory that describes a situation in where two people may not cooperate even though it seems in their best interest Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma (N- Person Game): A Prisoner s Dilemma game that is repeated over multiple rounds. Social Dilemma: A situation where the interests of an individual are at odds with the interest of another individual or group of individuals. Free- riding: Collecting a benefit without paying the cost (taking advantage of someone) Tit- for- tat: A strategy in cooperative games where a person copies the strategy of his/her partners.
PROJECT GUTS Instructions: The Prisoner s Dilemma STUDENT HANDBOOK You are now playing a card game. You will be playing three games, each consisting of a number of rounds. In each round you will be matched with another player. You will each make a decision regarding which card to play, and you will earn points based upon the card that you play and the card that the other person plays. Since the point total is determined by both players cards one of the four following possibilities will happen each round. Both play a red card = both earn 2 points Both play a black card = both earn 3 points You play black and other plays red = you earn 0 the other earns 5 You play red and other plays black = you earn 5 and other earns 0 Round Your Card (R/B) Other s Card Your Earnings (R/B) Red Red 2 Black Black 3 Black Red 0 Red Black 5 The two people with the top scores in each of the three games will win a ticket. These tickets are entries in a lottery for cash prizes. The lottery will be held on the last day of class. GAME 1 For Game One, please don t talk to others while we are playing. You are now playing a card game in which you will be randomly matched with someone else in the class. Step 1. Choose a card (red or black) before you meet your partner. Step 2. You will be randomly matched with a partner. Step 3. In silence, reveal your cards to each other. Step 4. Record your decisions and earnings on your sheet Step 5. Repeat steps 1-4, 8 times.
PROJECT GUTS UNIT 1: THE SCIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP Instructions: The Prisoner s Dilemma PAGE 9 GAME 2 Game 2 is like Game 1 with one difference: once you have been matched with another player, you will play only with that player for a random number of rounds. Step 1. Choose a card (red or black) before you meet your first partner. Step 2. You will be randomly matched with a partner. Step 3. Reveal your cards to each other Step 4. Record your decisions and earnings on your sheet Step 5. Choose a card (red or black) for the next round with your partner Step 6. The facilitator rolls die to determine if the game has ended. If the six sided die turns up 1, then the game is over and move on to game 3. If the die turns up 2-6 then go back to step 3. If the game happens to end on rounds 1-3 in the first try, you might try starting a new game 2 with a new partner (starting at Step 1) and continue filling out the decision sheet from where you left off. GAME 3 For this last round, you may talk and select your partner for each round. Step 1. Pick a partner Step 2. Choose a card (red or black) Step 3. Reveal your cards to each other Step 4. Record your decisions and earnings on your sheet Step 5. If you have finished round 8, then stop. If not, you can choose to stay with your current partner or find another partner and then return to Step 2.
Student Data Sheet UNIT #: THE SCIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP Game 1 For Game One, please don t talk to others while we are playing. You are now playing a card game in which you will be randomly matched with someone else in the class. Step 1. Choose a card (red or black) before you meet your partner. Step 2. You will be randomly matched with a partner. Step 3. In silence, reveal your cards to each other. Step 4. Record your decisions and earnings on your sheet Step 5. Repeat steps 1-4, 8 times. Round Your Card (R/B) Other s Card (R/B) Your Earnings
UNIT 1: THE SCIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP Student Data Sheet PAGE 11 Game 2 Game 2 is like Game 1 with one difference: once you have been matched with another player, you will play only with that player for a random number of rounds. Step 1. Choose a card (red or black) before you meet your first partner. Step 2. You will be randomly matched with a partner. Step 3. Reveal your cards to each other Step 4. Record your decisions and earnings on your sheet Step 5. Choose a card (red or black) for the next round with your partner Step 6. The facilitator rolls die to determine if the game has ended. If the six sided die turns up 1, then the game is over and move on to game 3. If the die turns up 2-6 then go back to step 3. If the game happens to end on rounds 1-3 in the first try, you might try starting a new game 2 with a new partner (starting at Step 1) and continue filling out the decision sheet from where you left off. Round Your Card (R/B) Other s Card (R/B) Your Earnings
Student Data Sheet STUDENT HANDBOOK Game 3 For Game 3, you may talk and choose your partner for each round. Step 1. Pick a partner Step 2. Choose a card (red or black) Step 3. Reveal your cards to each other Step 4. Record your decisions and earnings on your sheet Step 5. If you have finished round 8, then stop. If not, you can choose to stay with your current partner or find another partner and then return to Step 2. Round Your Card (R/B) Other s Card (R/B) Your Earnings
UNIT 1: THE SCIENCE OF FRIENDSHIP PAGE 13 NetLogo Code for Week 1 (Painted Turtles) to setup clear- all create- ordered- turtles 8 [ fd 10 set size 3 ] reset- ticks end ; create eight turtles facing out in equal angles ; turtles step out into a circle ; make turtles bigger so you can see them better ; set tick counter to 0 on set- up to go ask turtles [ rt 10 forward 1 ifelse pen- down? [pen- down] [pen- up] ] tick end ; turn right 10 degrees ; advance one step ; makes pen- down? switch work ; advance tick counter by one each tick