The Higher Education Policy of the European Union. With or Against the Member States?

CENTRE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH The Higher Education Policy of the European Union. With or Against the Member States? The final publication is available at http://www.amazon.com/higher-education-nation-state- Issues/dp/0080427901 DE WIT, K. & J. C. VERHOEVEN (2001) 'The Higher Education Policy of the European Union. With or against the Member States?' in: HUISMAN, J., P. MAASSEN & G. NEAVE(eds) Higher education and the nation state. Oxford : Pergamon Press pp. 194-250 Kurt De Wit & Jef C. Verhoeven

The Higher Education Policy of the European Union With or Against the Member States? KURT DE WIT AND JEF C. VERHOEVEN 1 Introduction The European Union is a complex organisation. Instead of being a coherent and balanced construction, the EU resembles a Greek temple, consisting of three different pillars (i.e. the European Communities; foreign and security policy; and police and judicial co-operation). Each pillar has specific characteristics and defines the role of the European institutions in a particular way (Kerremans, 1992). The balance between the power of the EU and of the Member States differs both between and within these pillars. This complexity is the result of a long process of negotiations between states, which had to choose between co-operation and loss of autonomy on the one hand, and safeguarding their own sovereignty on the other. Given the long 'tradition' of war between the nation states of Europe, the former option was not self-evident. But as the success of European integration increased, fully retaining national sovereignty was perceived by more and more states to be the least preferable (Davies, 1996: 1057). The same dynamics can be seen in the development of a higher education policy at EU-level. Education is an important feature of the nation state and is closely related to the establishment and continuation of the nation-state (Green, 1997). Nevertheless, countries increasingly compare their education systems and policies (Neave, 1995), and a certain degree of convergence between education systems is widespread (Green, 1997: 174). The growing importance of the EU in education matters is at once an indication, a result, and a catalyst of this process of internationalisation. This chapter will describe and try to understand the development of the higher education policy of the European Union from the perspective of national sovereignty vs. Europeanisation. The focus will be on policies and programmes that specifically regard the educational function of higher education 1 This chapter is based on data of the research project "Governmental policies and programmes for strengthening the relationship between higher education institutions and the national economy (HEINE)" (SOE-CT97-2018), carried out within the framework of the Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) programme of the European Union.

institutions (student mobility, language proficiency, international co-operation,) or only partly bear upon this educational function (higher education - industry co-operation, R&D programmes ). This chapter comprises three parts, each corresponding to a particular phase in the development of EU higher education policy, and each providing an overview of the EU education programmes of the period under attention. The first phase began with the first meeting of the Ministers of Education of the EC-countries in 1971. After subsequent meetings, a framework agreement was reached on an Action Programme in the field of education (1976). Established and executed in what has been termed the 'dark ages' of European integration (Keohane & Hoffman, 1991), the programme was scarcely more than a symbolic starting point for higher education co-operation in Europe. The second phase in the EU higher education policy (1983-1992) was initiated by both legal (lawsuits before the European Court of Justice) and political developments (the Solemn Declaration on European Union, the Single European Act). These pointed to a (gradual and contested) shift in interpretation vis a vis the authority of the European Community in the field of education, making possible incentive-driven action programmes at community-level (COMETT, ERASMUS). The Treaty on European Union (1992), also known as Treaty of Maastricht, marks the beginning of the third period. The acquis communautaire in the field of (higher) education, i.e. the whole of acquired rights and obligations, was formally confirmed, leading to a rationalisation, reorganisation, and elaboration of the Community action programmes. At the same time, however, the authority of the EU in relationship with the Member States was limited and strictly defined. The first agreements between the national governments (1971-1983) A weak basis for action The project of European integration was not intended to be limited solely to economics and trade. The founding fathers of the European Union (Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann) believed that the economic integration of the countries of Europe was the stepping stone for bringing about political integration and accordingly, peace. They sought to create a 'European Civil Society' (Schmitter, 1996: 229). They were aware, however, that this political view on European integration was not generally accepted. The goal of the Monnet-Schumann plan, therefore, was to establish unity through concrete achievements, aiming at a real solidarity. This plan marked its first step in 1951, when six countries (Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) founded the European Coal and Steel Community. The choice for this particular sector was no coincidence. It represented not only the economic importance of the coal and steel, but also possessed symbolic value: European conflicts since 1870 had strongly focussed on the small area around the Ruhr where a high concentration of coal and steel ore was to be found. (Van De Meerssche, 1990: 56). Economic co-operation was further developed in the new sector of atomic energy (the European Atomic Energy Community, 1957) and, more generally, in the shape of a customs union (the European Economic Community, 1957). For years to come, different views about the ultimate aim of the Communities - economic co-operation alone vs. broader-ranging integration - would limit their activities to the economic domain. It comes as no surprise, then, that education -a subject not mentioned as such in the founding treaties of the Communities - was not considered a priority (by many, it was not even deemed to be an issue) for the European Communities. Yet, the founding treaties already contained the basis for later initiatives in the

field of education. The basis for such developments rested on the treaty articles dealing with vocational training, which received some attention because the level of employee training could be construed as an economic factor. The Treaty which established the European Coal and Steel Community mentioned retraining of employees (article 56). Likewise, the Treaty setting up the European Economic Community (EEC) touched upon the vocational training of farmers (article 41) of employees (article 118), and also the mutual recognition of academic qualifications (article 57). But the most important article -not immediately but later in the early 1980s, as we shall see - was article 128. It enabled the European Community to lay down general principles on vocational training. Vocational training was however not considered as a priority policy issue either. In 1963, the Council issued a Decision that laid down general principles for a common policy on vocational training 2. These principles remained without follow-up, however, until 1971, when the Council adopted general guidelines for a Community-level programme in the field of vocational training 3 which sought to improve the scope and quality of vocational training systems. For the first time, these guidelines acknowledged the connection between economic policy, social policy and education. Despite the setting up of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) in 1975 4 in effect, action was limited. Several reasons account for this (Neave, 1984: 61). First, Member States did not regard public intervention in vocational training a priority. Second, the Commission had no real specific legal grounding upon which to act. Third, the Commission had only limited staff and financial resources. And finally, in the Member States the responsibility for vocational training was often dispersed across different ministries. The Communities were in the first place economic ventures. Neither vocational training nor education was considered priority policy issues. Nevertheless, the need for co-operation in education, particularly higher education, was acknowledged already in the 1960s (e.g. the Declaration of Bonn in 1961 5 ). But this commitment to educational co-operation did not go further than general statements. The Ministers of Education of the EC-countries only met for the first time in 1971. To make such a meeting possible, a special arrangement was created. The Ministers of Education met as a formal session of the Council of Ministers, which is the main legislative body of the EC and consists of one minister for each Member State government 6. But the meeting of the Ministers of Education was also a diplomatic conference. This formula of 'the Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council' expressed the difficult relationship between a developing Community and the sovereignty of the Member States. Because education was not a formal part of the founding treaties, it was neither legally nor politically straightforward to co-operate at the Community 2 Official Journal of the European Communities, 1963: 1338-1341. 3 Official Journal, 1971 Communications (C) 81: 5-11. 4 Official Journal, 1975 Legislation (L) 39: 1-4. 5 Bulletin of the European Community, 1961, 7-8: 40-42. 6 Given its composition, the Council of Ministers represents the national interests.

level in this area. Since the meetings of the Ministers of Education were both diplomatic meetings as well as formal Council meetings, more flexible decision-making procedures were possible than those imposed on the Council in this respect (De Witte, 1993: 194). In this way, the Ministers of Education could discuss all matters and issue resolutions if they liked, without their being legally binding upon Member States 7. This proviso was important. Not all Member States were willing to extend the powers of the Community into non-treaty areas. France for example, played up its national sovereignty and preferred therefore intergovernmental rather than Community-level co-operation (cf. the inclusion of the European Council, i.e. the heads of state and government 8, in the formal structure of the Communities - a proposal put out by the then president of the French Republic, Valéry Giscard d'estaing). The meeting of the Ministers of Education in November 1971 was held in response to the perceived need to add to the guidelines on vocational training by co-operation in the field of education. Five items figured on the agenda: 1) the mutual recognition of diplomas; 2) the foundation of a European University Institute; 3) co-operation in the field of higher education, and secondary education; 4) the foundation of a European centre for educational development; and 5) the foundation of transfrontier institutions for higher education. The main outcome of the meeting was the weighing up of how far political will would, in effect, permit steps to be taken towards realising each of these items. Co-operation in education still gave rise to many second thoughts. Several reasons account for this. At a more general level - although the discussion revolved around education - the juridical interpretation of the founding treaties was not without its problems, especially since it touched upon another issue at the political level, namely the purpose of the European Communities: Was their goal to be confined to the economic dimension or was it also to embrace the political, social, and cultural? In this period, political integration was ruled out. The Europe of sovereign states (Europe des états) envisaged by the former French president, Charles De Gaulle, was still dominant. Thus, it was not surprising that disagreements on the political level between Member States affected the basis of educational agreements (inside or outside the formal EC-structure), and also the institutional structure (establishing a committee - permanent or ad hoc - with the European Commission 9 or with the Council), quite apart from the principle of cooperation itself (Community-level or on the level of the Member States) (Brouwer, 1996: 121). More specifically, grounds for reserve towards European educational co-operation sprang on the one hand from the fact that education systems were - and tend still to be today - primarily nationally oriented. Such differences as followed from this made co-operation delicate indeed. On the other hand, the view which emerged from time to time that co-operation in education, culture, should be based upon a broader association like the Council of Europe (Neave, 1984: 6). 7 Resolutions are not legally binding acts, that are merely the expression of the political will of the Member States. 8 The heads of state and government of the Member States, and the president of the European Commission, meet at least twice a year in the European Council. The European Council decides on broad policy lines and political guidelines to be followed by the European Community. It is not to be confused with the Council of Ministers. 9 The Commission is independent of national governments and acts in the interests of the Community only.

Despite these difficulties, the development of a European educational policy could not be gainsaid. The Heads of State and Government at their Paris meeting in October 1972 clearly stated that the goal of European Union was not economic expansion as such, but economic expansion as a means to improve the quality of life (Neave, 1984: 62). In February 1973, Henri Janne, one time Minister of Education for Belgium, then consulted as an independent expert, presented the report For a Community Policy in Education 10. An irreversible recognition of an education dimension of Europe had begun, it argued, and such a situation led on to an educational policy at Community level. The Janne Report reiterated the view of the Ministers of Education that the Treaty of Rome (i.e. the EEC-Treaty) could be interpreted in such that clauses dealing with vocational training could arguably be extended to cover a wider ambit. The Commission presented draft proposals for the development of Communitylevel action, the main points of which were contained in the report of Ralph. Dahrendorf 11, then director-general of Directorate General (DG) XII, which exercised responsibility for Education since the enlargement of the Community through the adhesion of Denmark, Ireland and the UK on 1 January 1973. The second meeting of the Ministers of Education, in June 1974, agreed 12 to the proposals of the Commission that co-operation should proceed and should apply to specific priority areas (these areas reappeared in the Resolution of February 1976, see below). Three of the priority areas involved higher education: 1) to increase co-operation between higher education institutions; 2) to improve possibilities for academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study; and 3) to encourage the freedom of movement and mobility of teachers, researchers and students. An ad-hoc Education Committee was established, encharged with drafting an action programme and preparing the future agenda of the Education Ministers. The Action Programme in the Field of Education The activities of the Education Committee led to two meetings of the 'Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council' in 1975 and 1976 and subsequently to the formal unveiling in 1976 of an Action Programme in the Field of Education 13. The Action Programme provided only a frame agreement. But, by setting out the main objectives of an education policy at Community level, it laid down the basis for future co-operation in the field of education. Among the objectives were improving education and training facilities, improving foreign language teaching, achieving equal opportunities for free access to all forms of education, and promoting closer relations between educational systems in Europe. 10 Bulletin, Supplement 10, 1973. 11 Bulletin, 1973, 5, 2237 2241. 12 Official Journal, 1974 C 98: 2. 13 Official Journal, 1976 C 38: 1-5.

In higher education the Action Programme concentrated on the three priority areas. First, an increase in co-operation between higher education institutions was to be urged on by the development of: 1. links between organisations representing higher education institutions (for example the European Society for Engineering Education, the Association for Teacher Education in Europe); 2. Short study visits; and 3. Joint programmes of study or research. Second, turning its attention to mobility, the programme initiated a discussion which revolved around the admission of students, the drafting of a report on the extension of national schemes, and the examination of recommendations to remove obstacles to student mobility. Third, the programme sought to extend academic recognition of diplomas and study periods, by means of a report analysing the current situation and containing proposals for its improvement. In addition, consultations had to be held and co-operation organised. At Member State level, the programme called for periods spent abroad teaching or conducting research to be taken into account when calculating seniority and also pension entitlements. This agreement set out a basic framework, general and not very far-reaching, it has to be admitted. Nevertheless, it marked an important milestone. Negotiations over the programme led to regular meetings of the Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council. For its part, the Education Committee assumed a permanent status in the decision-making of the EC. From the outset, the Community's educational policy derived from the principle of co-operation, not harmonisation. Finally, whilst the Action Programme entailed in the main action at the intergovernmental level, the Commission was entrusted with promoting co-operation in the field of higher education, albeit under the strict proviso that it should respect the autonomy of institutions and should limit action in the area of higher education to those means and goals set down by the Action Programme. Elaborating slightly - the basic agreement. Because the Education Action Programme constituted only a framework, detailed and more elaborate executive measures had still to be worked out. This task, however, was far from obvious. Nor was it without either challenge or dissent. In 1978, the Danish government pointed out that the EC was nothing more than an economic entity and that education was not part of the treaties. Hence, the Danish government observed, the Commission had no competence to act in this field. Furthermore, transfer of national authority to the EC was not negotiable (Brouwer, 1996: 144). Such a line of argument had direct repercussions on the Action Programme itself. Because the Action Programme reposes for the greater part on intergovernmental co-operation and only partially on co-operation at Community level, its status hung in the balance. Several dossiers (teaching about Europe in schools; teaching of foreign languages; teacher training; education and training for the disabled) were brought to a halt. (Neave, 1984: 125-148). Likewise, the meetings of the Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council which were suspended until 1980. Any compromise seemed excluded. Far more to the point and in consequence of this brouhaha, the education budget for 1981 and 1982 was pared to an uncharitable minimum. Even so, part of this curtailed budget was assigned to grant programmes in the field of higher education, programmes which the Commission's initiative had already established. Such grant

programmes were in effect the implementation of the Action Programmes the first priority, to wit, cooperation between higher education institutions. The most important of these programmes was the Joint Study Programme Scheme 14, intended to promote study abroad programmes in higher education. The JSP scheme directed Community aid to the development and the implementation of agreements between two or more institutions of higher education across different Member States. It supported: 1. student exchange for periods of study abroad integrated as part of their normal courses (with particular weight being attached to the formal recognition of the study period) by each institution; 2. integrated teaching assignments in another Community country for staff members; and 3. joint curricular development of modules for insertion into the programmes of the participating institutions. Given the major dispute over the legitimate authority of the EC to develop such programmes, it is easy to see why resources remained fairly modest - about 2 million ECU for the academic year 1984/85 to cover programmes across ten Member States. The scheme did not provide maintenance funding for the projects. Such responsibility was deemed to fall to the institutions themselves. The second element in spurring on the cross-frontier co-operation of higher education was the Short Study Visits Scheme (SSV) The Short Study Visits Scheme 15 enabled individual teachers, researchers, and administrative staff to study particular aspects of the organisation and administration of different systems of higher education and higher education institutions, and especially their relationship with local, regional, and national structures. SSVs were often used to prepare a joint study programme. Though not very important per se, nevertheless they were not wholly bereft of significance. Indeed, they can be regarded as a species of 'pilot projects' for the more financially robust initiatives that were later to emerge in the shape of ERASMUS, the European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students. The discussion of student admission policy to higher education (priority 2 of the Action Programme) proceeded with great difficulty. Some countries raised obstacles to the admission of foreign students (for example Belgium, Ireland, and the UK introduced differential fees for overseas students). To this situation, a Community-level solution was sought. Furthermore, Denmark questioned the treaty basis on which EC action in this domain rested. (See above). Though the Commission drew up a range of common principles to deal with this issue, the 'Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council' could only agree on a framework (Neave, 1984: 82-83). The framework contented itself with advising on such matters as numerical limitations, criteria of admission, financial aspects, language proficiency, and procedures administrative. The Action Programme's third priority area - academic recognition of diplomas - has always been problematic. The programme itself was not greatly ambitious: the drafting of a report and the organising 14 Resolution of February 9 th 1976. For an evaluation of the JSP scheme, see Dalichov and Teichler, 1986. 15 General Report of the Education Committee of 27 June 1980.

of consultations. Six years later the aims had not in essence, altered. On 24 May 1982 the Member States agreed on a programme which involved no more than the drawing up of reports and the dissemination of information, in addition to which a policy of including such measures in bilateral agreements between Member States was to be urged on, students were to be encouraged to study in another Member State once the qualification was recognised, and authorities were to be cajoled into to adopting a favourable attitude (Neave, 1984: 88). Nation-States and intergovernmentalism Solidarity through co-operation was the key idea upon which three European Communities were established, first among six States, and later among twelve. Yet, right from the beginning one question remained unanswered: Co-operation of what kind? Participating States certainly drew upon the benefits of economic co-operation. Political integration, or a spillover from the economic domain to other areas, was however not readily accepted. Individual governments of the Member States, through the European Council and the Council of Ministers, dominated European policy-making. Thus, most actions were of an intergovernmental nature; that is, they were established outside the framework of the Communities. The European Commission, the representative of the interest of the Community, could not easily play a significant role. Its staff numbers was limited. It had no unchallengeable legal basis upon which to act: education was not mentioned in the Treaties, and vocational training figured only in so far as general principles were concerned. Finally, its financial resources were limited. It could not draw upon ECfunded budget to fund an area which was not part of the Treaties. Because of this fragility and despite the fact that the Commission in fact was given the authority to act in the field of higher education, only a small number of limited and partial measures could be initiated - the Joint Study Programme Scheme was perhaps the most visible example. It is then, premature to speak of a 'policy' of the EC in respect of higher education in this period - and a fortiori when one examines other levels of education. Yet, the importance of the Action Programme in the Field of Education of 1976 and the undertakings based on this framework agreement, should not be underestimated either. For the first time, Member States recognised the (economic) importance of higher education for the Community. The Ministers of Education began regular meetings. An Education Committee was established. Clearly, the EC in the period up till the mid-1980s was mainly an economical-technical venture, in which the Member States saw little need for social, cultural or political co-operation. Even so, the debate on the possibility of Community action in education was joined. In the sphere of higher education, the Commission was even endowed with a scope for action, marginal it is true, in the face of the considerable weight the Member States laid upon national sovereignty. Increasing community-level co-operation 1983-1992

Other interpretations, new possibilities At the start of the 1980's. European integration was in deep crisis. For more than a decade, building a united Europe had kindled little enthusiasm. The economic crisis in Europe had reinforced the tendency, prevalent all too often, of States to withdraw within themselves, and conceding little room for other than intergovernmental agreements. That this state of affairs applied also to the field of higher education is evident. The Action Programme remained a framework agreement which barely aroused concrete measures let alone significant and concrete acts. This nadir in European relations did not mark the end of integration, however. On the contrary, it proved to be a new starting point, especially for economic co-operation and integration, both of which were symbolised in project '1992'. Even in higher education, important developments stood in the offing. Within the European Commission, the conviction gradually took hold that Member States, acting individually could not overcome the economic recession. A strong and efficient Community was needed to restructure the European economy in keeping with the demands of globalisation. Not surprisingly, the Member States that pursued opposite or even incompatible economic policies (Van De Meerssche, 1990: 197) were not at first eager to follow this precept. Initiatives within both the European Parliament and the Commission itself brought about an astonishing conversion. In 1984, the European Parliament adopted a draft treaty, which proposed to strengthen the position of the European institutions and to increase the financial means of the EC. In a counter move, the European Council established two committees - the Dooge Committee on institutional reform, and the Adonnino Committee on a People's Europe. Their mandate was to prepare an intergovernmental conference. By such a tactic, the fundamental decision to strengthen the EC and to diminish the sovereignty of the Member States was postponed. Meanwhile, a new chairman of the Commission had been appointed: Jacques Delors. Under his leadership the Commission presented to the European Council a White Paper on the completion of the internal market. On this basis, the intergovernmental conference of December 1985 could agree to amend the EEC-Treaty. The agreement was to form the basis for the Single European Act (see 2.4). Although aimed in the first place on economic matters, these manoeuvrings were not without consequence for other domains and, from this perspective, may be seen as another example of the 'spill-over effect' which the Founding Fathers of the Communities had anticipated. In the domain of higher education, a new interpretation of the role and authority of the EC began to make its way. Within the European Community, co-operation in the field of education under went change as well. The second phase of implementing the Action Programme in the Field of Education began increasingly to work its effects upon Community-level co-operation. This was true for other areas which, since 1976, had taken aboard elements of co-operation, as was the case of the transition from school to working life programme and its counterpart dealing with disadvantaged groups. Likewise, higher education, which had been very much an exception inasmuch as the Commission could (at least in principle) take initiatives there, co-operation at Community level expanded.

Both legally and politically, the symbolic turning point for higher education fell in 1983. In the legal sphere, the European Court of Justice 16 played an important role. In its judgement on the 'Forchieri' and 'Gravier' cases, 17 the Court stated that admission and the conditions of admission to, vocational training were fell within the legal ambit of the EEC-Treaty. Furthermore, in the 'Blaizot' case 18 it confirmed that university studies could also be regarded as a form of vocational training. Effectively, the Court of Justice re-interpreted article 128 of the EEC-Treaty on vocational training in a new and unexpected way. Formerly confined to laying down general principles at the European level, the scope of article 128 was enlarged and that substantially. The Court upheld the basic principle that discrimination on the ground of nationality was illegal. It argued that migrant workers and their families could already claim educational rights within the framework of the free movement of workers (Verbruggen, 1994: 53) - and on this basis, it confirmed the individual educational rights of all European citizens. The Court stated that if a country allowed an advantage to its nationals, it had equally to confer the same right or treatment equally upon all ECcitizens - for example, the right to enter higher education, or the right to work for higher education institutions. In other words, each citizen had a self-standing right to equal treatment in access to vocational training. For those moving to another Member State for the sole purpose of studying, however, this equality in treatment could be restricted by general conditions of access (e.g. study qualifications, language proficiency). Only access restricted on grounds of nationality was ruled out. The statement and upholding of these principles by the Court of Justice de facto broadened the legal basis for community-level co-operation in the field of education. Thus, the authority of the EC and hence the right of initiative of the Commission in the field of education, although not included in any treaty, obtained formal and legal recognition. In the political domain too, a different interpretation of the role of the EC in (higher) education emerged. Revived interest in the process of economic integration within the Community, together with the belief that economic integration alone could not gain the support of Europe's citizens, lent a new urgency to the demand for new and imaginative measures above all in areas beyond the rigidly economic. Bit by bit, higher education moved gradually into the focus of attention amongst Europe's political leaders. One of the first signs in this new direction came from the European Council in its Solemn Declaration on European Union (1983) 19. The Heads of State and Government agreed to promote closer cooperation between higher education institutions. That same year, the 'Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council' determined that the prime objective of co-operation in higher education should be to spur on free movement and mobility for teachers, students and researchers 20. 16 The European Court of Justice is the supreme court of the EC. It ensures that the Treaties are respected and applied. In its preliminary rulings, it guarantees a uniform implementation of Community law in all Member States. 17 Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (Jur.) 1983, 2323-2338; Jur. 1985, 606-615. 18 Jur. 1988, 398-408. 19 Bulletin, 1983, 6, no. 1.6.1. 20 Bulletin, 1983, 6, no. 2.1.84.

Thus, the will to extend both intergovernmental co-operation and to give weight to the complementary function of the EC-initiatives as compared to national initiatives gradually took root. Against this background of putting European integration back on track, of changing legal interpretations, and shifting political views, the Commission came forward with the proposal to launch two incentive programmes. The first was to advance co-operation between higher education institutions and also between those institutions and business especially in the area of technological training; and the second was to forward the mobility of students, teachers and researchers. The two programmes, known respectively as COMETT and ERASMUS for the first time placed higher education before a tangible European reality (2.2). They also faced Member States with an unprecedented intervention in their national education systems (2.3). COMETT and ERASMUS The Community Action Programme for Education and Training in Technology (COMETT) 21 was the first major Community action programme in the field of education. First adopted in 1986 for a four-year period with a budget of 45 million ECUs, it was renewed in 1988 for five more years with funding amounting to 250 million ECUs. COMETT sought to impart a new level of intensity to co-operation between higher education and industry in the sphere of advanced training in new technologies. Amongst other, more focused goals were to insert a European dimension into co-operation between universities and firms; to foster the joint development of training programmes and the optimum use of training resources; to improve the supply of training; and to develop the level of training to meet technological and social changes. The programme supported the setting-up and development of a European network of university-enterprise training partnerships (UETPs); trans-national exchanges for trainees and staff of universities and companies. It developed joint projects for on-going training and multimedia training systems. It opened the path for the exchange of information and experience. Over the years, the focus has shifted from advanced to initial training. It has come to centre more on trans-national networks for projects. The programme came to be aligned increasingly on the specific needs of small and medium-sized businesses. In terms of the numbers of individuals, universities and firms participating, the COMETT programme was heralded - at least by the Commission - as a success. In the first phase of its operation, more than 1,300 projects were launched throughout the EC. They involved more than 6,000 firms, 1,500 higher education institutions, and 1,000 assorted other organisations of various types. Together, COMETT projects involved establishing 125 UETPs and 329 joint on-going training and multimedia projects, sponsored more than 4,000 traineeships for students in enterprises and awarded 232 grants for staff exchanges between universities and enterprises. The second phase of COMETT saw some 3,000 projects started. Within this framework, 2,000 UETPs were created, 40,000 trans-national exchanges and 10,000 advanced training courses organised. More than 4,500 different types of training materials, often based on software or video, were developed. The total number of higher education institutions participating exceeded 30,000. More 21 Official Journal, 1986 L 222: 17-21, and 1989 L 13: 57-63.

than 20,000 firms (mostly SMEs) and 5,000 other types of organisations were involved. During the programme's lifetime, the spread of participation among European countries, and the representation of technology-related sectors assumed a happier balance. Across Europe, so great was the demand from organisations for funding (funding was granted on the basis of quality and merit) that only 10 to 15 % of those applying were successful, despite the very substantial increase in the budget set aside for the second phase. Clearly, here is some pointer to the popularity of COMETT, although one does well to look beyond mere participation rates if one seeks the programme's real significance. The fact that 'free money' became available to many higher education institutions and for some for the first time, funds which often also served as 'seed money' to draw others (local authorities, firms ) in the joint- financing of a project (Cerych, 1996: 329). The second major action programme initiated by the Commission, the European Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) 22, is important for similar reasons: it provided a new source of funding. But the influence of ERASMUS reached further. The requirements to be met by higher education institutions if they were to receive incentive funding, brought about changes in higher education similar across Member States, and that largely independent of national intervention. A particularly striking example has been the establishment of international relations offices by many, if not all, higher education institutions. ERASMUS also reinforced the tendency, already evident at the national level, to look across borders and borrow from one's neighbours (Neave, 1995: 378). ERASMUS is probably the most influential, and certainly the best-known EC-programme. It is often referred to as the 'flagship of the EC educational programmes'. For these reasons, we will examine its characteristics and its attainments in more detail. ERASMUS evolved across two phases. First established in 1987 for a period of four years, it was extended with five years in 1989. Compared to the educational budget available before the start of ERASMUS, the annual sum now available rose by ten times (85 million ECU was available for the first phase) (Teichler and Maiworm, 1997: iii). ERASMUS' main objective was defined in economic terms: to increase significantly the number of higher education students spending an integrated period of study in another Member State. This was seen as a step towards creating a pool of suitably qualified manpower with first-hand experience of economic and social conditions in other Member States. To meet these objectives, ERASMUS concentrated on a student grants scheme, which dispensed financial support (2,000 ECU on average, 5,000 ECU maximum) to students following a period of study in another Member State. The goal was to provide 10 % of all students in EC higher education with such an opportunity. The grants supported mobility costs (travel, cost of language study, cost of living allowance in the host country). They were distributed proportionately in keeping with the number of 18 to 25 year olds and the number of students in each Member State. Later, account was taken of the distance between Member States and estimated differences in the cost of living between them. Whilst administration of the other activities within the ERASMUS programme was carried out by the ERASMUS Bureau (an autonomous body of the European Cultural Foundation), student mobility grants were handled by National Grant Awarding Authorities (NGAAs) thereby allowing limits to be placed on the amount granted to individual students in accordance with national circumstances. The 22 Official Journal, 1987 L 166: 20-24, and 1989 L 395: 23-27.

NGAAs were also responsible for national supplementary grant schemes, which were set up in France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium. To support the grant scheme, the ERASMUS programme promoted co-operation between higher education institutions by means of a European University Network which, in turn, supported Interuniversity Co-operation Programmes (ICPs). An ICP involves universities of several Member States concluding agreements for student exchange and thus fully recognising study periods spent outside the home university as an integral part of the student's diploma or academic qualification. An ICP can also include teacher exchange and co-operation. In addition, ERASMUS backed a modest attempt to bring academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study nearer to fruition. As we have said earlier, this has always been a delicate issue. Within the ERASMUS framework, one condition involved the home university fully recognising the period of study as counting towards the final diploma. Amongst the voluntary activities undertaken by universities in several Member States was joint curriculum development. The ERASMUS programme also introduced a credit transfer system (ECTS) and developed an information network (NARIC). The ECTS (European Community Course Credit Transfer System) was a pilot project designed to test a mechanism for the transfer of study credits between institutions. Institutions participating voluntarily in this pioneering work, awarded 60 credits per year for each course subdivided according to the workload of the course units included. On moving to a partner institution, the student received full recognition of work previously undertaken, whilst the home institution could easily ascertain the results achieved. For its part, the NARIC (Network for Academic Recognition Information Centres) brought together national centres whose task was to inform both institutions and individuals about higher education systems and their different qualifications. Surprisingly, the decision to develop ERASMUS also called upon Member States to lend their weight to those activities which served to establish ERASMUS' goals, an unusual step since generally speaking, Member States would only agree that action at Community-level was complementary to measures taken at national level, and not the other way round. ERASMUS was evaluated in detail by an inquiry carried out by the Comprehensive University of Kassel (Germany) and the final report published in 1997 (Teichler & Maiworm, 1997) 23. What were its main conclusions? First, participation both of institutions and of students had grown from year to year, as the following tables show. Table 1. Actual number of ICPs, partner units, and institutions in ERASMUS 1987/88 1993-94 23 This report brought together the results of 18 studies (statistical analyses and surveys) carried out by the ERASMUS evaluation research team at the Centre for Research on Higher Education and Work of the Comprehensive University of Kassel.

ICPs 293 2,228 Partner units 823 13,184 Institutions 416 1,458 Average number of students per ICP 11.1 26.7 Average number of students per institution 7.8 41.1 Source: Teichler & Maiworm, 1997 (several tables). Table 2. Actual number of students in ERASMUS, LINGUA (Action II), and ECTS Students in ICPs Free-movers ECTS Total ERASMUS LINGUA (Action II) ERASMUS LINGUA (Action II) 1987/88 3,244 - - - - 3,244 1988/89 9,330-584 - - 9,914 1989/90 18,354-615 - 487 19,456 1990/91 25,835 1,095 391-585 27,906 1991/92 32,160 2,685 719 50 700 36,314 1992/93 44,335 4,453 1,527 39 1,340 51,694 1993/94 54,379 5,161 1,383 26 1,413 62,362 Source: Teichler & Maiworm, 1997 (table 12). Yet, ERASMUS did not reach its numerical goal of 10 percent of higher education students studying abroad. Although student numbers rose from about 3,200 in 1987-88 to about 62,000 in 1993-94 (see Table 2), the target figure was about 150,000. Of the total number of foreign students at higher education institutions, ERASMUS students were a minority. Small scale mobility dominated: "more than one-third of the partner units involved sent and received only one or two students per year and a further third only three or five students" (Teichler & Maiworm, 1997: 188). Certainly, as centralisation in the administration of the ERASMUS scheme at institutional level later grew, so small scale mobility

tended to decline. "The success of ERASMUS (was), as the evaluation team noted, less often dependent on the all-round activity of a devoted local director" (Teichler & Maiworm, 1997: 190). Even so, ERASMUS' organisation and administration threw up many problems. Amongst them were: - The need for complementary resources (quite apart from the overall funding level and the level of support given to institutions); - Delays in both the decision to fund and in the payment of the award; - Difficulties in co-operating with partners in other European countries; - The overall administrative overload; - The plethora of detailed rules and regulations which ERASMUS entailed; - The lack of continuity in resourcing. To add to this cahier de doléances, funds were insufficient to support even those students recognised as eligible in the original allocation of the grant. Nor did allocation formulas provide equal support for extra costs incurred abroad for all students. Countries with a widely known language (notably Great Britain) received a disproportionately high number of students. Half the ERASMUS students reported having a knowledge of a foreign language inadequate for their successfully learning abroad. Staff exchange was not greatly esteemed. Yet, many students faced the unpleasant fact that their original period of study was prolonged by almost half the duration of the period spent abroad. That said, in summary, the report described the triumph of ERASMUS in the following terms: "Not only has it stimulated and reinforced enthusiasm; temporary student mobility has become a regular feature of higher education in Europe, and dedicated academic and administrative measures for Europeanisation and internationalisation of higher education are generally viewed now as essential for a dynamic institution of higher education. ERASMUS has turned out to be a mobilising mobility programme" (Teichler & Maiworm, 1997: 202). Surveys conducted by the Kassel team amongst those in charge of ERASMUS activities at the level of the individual institution, show that ERASMUS funding was highly appreciated as a catalyst for international mobility and co-operation. Modest financial support gave rise to many other activities. Thus, the general purpose of ERASMUS (with its emphasis on temporary study abroad, its commitment to curricular integration, and its preference for highly organised student mobility ) became widely accepted. ERASMUS' main outcome would seem to involve changing the attitudes of students towards internationalisation and Europeanisation generally but especially among those students participating in it. More than the average, former ERASMUS students chose to continue their studies or advanced professional training, and subsequently opted to work or study abroad. Amongst the most positive features of their time abroad in Europe was less their academic progress as such, so much as the broadening of their cultural horizon and their improved language proficiency. The evaluation of ERASMUS identified several elements of 'good practice' which produced good results and, for that reason, will be important in the future: language preparation at a high academic level; assistance during the stay abroad; a broad range of activities undertaken together; and curriculum development.

Intergovernmental vs. supranational decision-making The COMETT and ERASMUS Action Programmes forced Member States to face up to some of their own potential weaknesses. Here were programmes, developed by a supranational body (the Commission), based on incentive funding from a supra-national source, which had direct impact on a traditionally nation-based institution. Reactions were not slow in coming. Both programmes were subject to legal challenge. The issue on which battle was joined focused on the procedure used to establish them. Programmes relating vocational training came under the terms of article 128 of the EEC-Treaty. This stated that "The Council shall, acting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, lay down general principles for implementing a common vocational training policy capable of contributing to the harmonious development both of the national economies and of the common market". In this particular instance, the procedure employed involved qualified majority voting. As we have seen the scope of article 128 and, hence, the use of qualified majority voting, had been gradually extended by the European Court of Justice. As a consequence, the Commission had greater room for initiative, and this, in turn, increased the likelihood that measures at Community level could taken be against the wishes, or even the policies, of one or more Member States. Hence, whenever a programme seemed to exceed the scope involved in the legislation on vocational training, an additional article had to be drawn up to guarantee the legality of that programme. Article 235 provided the EC with the possibility of taking actions in fields, which, if unspecified in the treaties, were necessary for the operation of the common market. But it also stipulated that such decisions were to be taken unanimously: "If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures". Member States often argued that article 235 should be included in the legal basis of the programmes, since this would mean that each Member State had a right of veto. The decision defining the legal basis of both ERASMUS and COMETT was pursued right up to the European Court of Justice. In the case of ERASMUS, the Council supported by the UK, Germany and France, argued that article 128 of the EEC-Treaty did not allow the Council to take measures which went beyond the initial stages of a vocational training policy. Because ERASMUS included stimulation measures, the Council added article 235 to the legal basis of the programme. On 7 August 1987 the Commission started an appeal procedure at the Court of Justice against the addition of this article 24. In the 'ERASMUS' case 25 the Court of Justice ruled that article 128 did indeed provide the legal basis for Community-level action by the Council, because all means necessary to execute the common policy intended by this article could not be withheld from the Community. But the Court also stated that the ERASMUS-programme included measures which not only concerned vocational training but 24 Official Journal, 1987 C 242: 4. 25 Jur. 1989, 1432-1435.