Between efficiency and equity What countries stand to gain

Transcription

1 1 1 50th Anniversary of the ERI Between efficiency and equity What countries stand to gain 15 May 2015 Andreas Schleicher

2 Mean score High mathematics performance Shanghai China performs above this line (613) Chinese Taipei Singapore Hong Kong-China Korea Average performance of 15-year-olds in Mathematics (PISA) Fig I Poland Belgium Germany Austria Slovenia New Zealand Denmark Czech Republic France LuxembourgLatvia Portugal Spain Slovak Republic United States Hungary Israel Greece Romania Chile Macao-China Japan Liechtenstein Switzerland Netherlands Estonia Finland Canada Viet Nam Australia Ireland United Kingdom Iceland Norway Italy Russian Fed. Lithuania Sweden Croatia Serbia Turkey Bulgaria U.A.E. Kazakhstan Thailand Malaysia Mexico Low mathematics performance Below PISA Level 2

3 Low mathematics performance Iran* Costa Rica Montenegro BrazilArgentina Tunisia Saudi Arabia* Indonesia Peru Uruguay Bahrain* Georgia* Albania Jordan Macedonia Colombia Qatar Botswana* Oman* Morocco* Honduras* South Africa* Ghana* * Substituted from TIMSS 250

4 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% The world is no longer divided between rich and welleducated countries, and poor and badly-educated ones High income does not protect against poor education Share of 15-year-olds below PISA Level 2 in high-income countries (>25K$) (reading, math and science) Qatar Oman Saudi Arabia Bahrain Malaysia Kazakhstan UAE Israel Greece Slovak Republic Sweden Luxembourg Hungary Iceland United States Portugal Italy Russian Federation Lithuania Norway France Spain New Zealand Belgium United Kingdom Czech Republic Austria Denmark Australia Slovenia Latvia Germany Netherlands Ireland Switzerland Canada Poland Chinese Taipei Finland Japan Singapore Korea Estonia Hong-Kong China

5 Regular but moderate physical exercise is good for our health Answering this question correctly corresponds to a difficulty of 386 score points on the PISA science scale. Across countries, 82% of students answered correctly. This question assesses students competency of What happens when muscles are exercised? Circle Yes or No for each statement. explaining phenomena scientifically. Does this happen when muscles are exercised? Muscles get an increased flow of blood. Fats are formed in the muscles. Yes or No? Yes / No Yes / No % students by country who answered correctly Finland 93 Hungary 91 Russian Federation 90 Slovenia 89 Latvia 88 Czech Republic 88 Iceland 88 Greece 87 Portugal 87 Croatia 86 Spain 86 Italy 85 Liechtenstein 85 Hong Kong China 85 Australia 85 Canada 84 Denmark 84 Serbia 84 New Zealand 84 Belgium 84 Poland 84 Netherlands 84 Tunisia 83 Slovak Republic 83 United Kingdom 83 OECD average 82 Sweden 82 Switzerland 82 Chile 82 Turkey 82 Thailand 81 Macao China 81 Bulgaria 81 Jordan 80 Israel 80 Japan 80 Luxembourg 79 Austria 79 France 79 Mexico 78 Germany 77 Estonia 77 Chinese Taipei 77 Norway 76 United States 76 Romania 76 Montenegro 76 Ireland 76 Argentina 75 Lithuania 73 Azerbaijan 72 Brazil 71 Korea 68 Colombia 63 Kyrgyzstan 57 Indonesia 54 Qatar 53

6 Mei Ling from Singapore was preparing to go to South Africa for 3 months as an exchange student. She needed to change some Singapore dollars (SGD) into South African rand (ZAR). Question: Mei Ling found out that the exchange rate between Singapore dollars and South African rand was: Answering this question correctly corresponds to a difficulty of 406 score points on the PISA mathematics scale. Across countries, 80% of students answered 1 SGD = 4.2 ZAR Mei Ling changed 3000 Singapore dollars into South African correctly. To answer the question correctly rand at students this exchange have to draw rate. on skills from the How much reproduction money competency in South cluster. African rand did Mei Ling get? zar Answer: % students by country who answered correctly Liechtenstein 95 Macao China 93 Finland 90 France 89 Hong Kong China 89 Sweden 89 Austria 87 Switzerland 87 Belgium 87 Czech Republic 87 Canada 86 Slovak Republic 86 Iceland 86 Denmark 85 Russian Federation 85 Luxembourg 85 Netherlands 85 Hungary 84 Ireland 83 Germany 83 Australia 81 Korea 81 Latvia 80 New Zealand 80 OECD average 80 Japan 79 Spain 79 Serbia 79 Norway 77 Poland 77 Portugal 74 United Kingdom 74 Greece 73 Italy 71 Uruguay 71 Mexico 60 Thailand 60 Turkey 60 Indonesia 59 Tunisia 55 United States 54 Brazil 37

7 7 7 Methods Some methodological considerations to estimate the impact of improved basic skills on long term economic growth

8 Underlying growth model The projections assume that higher educational achievement allows a country to keep on growing at a higher rate in the long run Education increases the innovative capacity of the economy through developing new ideas and new technologies A given level of education can lead to a continuing stream of new ideas, thus making it possible for education to affect growth even when no new education is added to the economy.

9 Alternative growth models An aggregate production function where the output of the macro economy is a direct function of capital and labour The human capital component of growth comes through accumulation of more education that implies the economy moves from one steady state level to another; once at the new level, education exerts no further influence on growth.

10 Assumptions Improvements will occur steadily from today s performance up to reaching the post 2015 goals in 2030 It will take another 40 years until the more skilled workers replace the existing workforce The growth rate is calculated each year into the future based on the average skill of workers Future gains in GDP are discounted to the present with a 3% discount rate (so that the projections are directly comparable to current levels of GDP).

11 11 An example Country Improvement/y Montenegro 1.7 Chile 1.9 Serbia 2.2 Poland 2.6 Italy 2.7 Portugal 2.8 Mexico 3.1 Tunisia 3.1 Turkey 3.2 Dubai (UAE) 3.7 Singapore 3.8 Brazil 4.1 Bulgaria 4.2 Shanghai-China 4.2 Israel 4.2 Romania 4.9 Albania 5.6 U.A.E. * 5.9 Malaysia 8.1 Kazakhstan 9 Qatar 9.2 Annual improvement by 1.67 PISA points per year (=25 points by 2030) and full enrolment Present value of added GDP would be 340% of the country s current GDP over the next 80 years (or on average 7.3% higher GDP each year) By 2095, GDP would be 30% higher than with current skill levels This is equivalent to an annual growth rate that is 0.5 percentage points higher than at current skill levels.

12 12 Skills and growth

13 13 Causality in brief Couldn t higher growth cause higher achievement? Correlation between education spending and student performance is weak, so it is unlikely that the relationship comes from growth induced resources lifting student achievement For a subset of countries, the period of testing has been separated from the subsequent period of observed economic impacts, but the impact was even bigger Couldn t other factors besides cognitive skills be responsible for countries growth? In an extensive investigation of alternative model specifications, different measures of cognitive skills, various groupings of countries (including some that eliminate regional differences), and specific subperiods of economic growth have been employed but the results show high consistency in the alternative estimates, in both quantitative impacts and statistical significance Neither do measures of geographical location, political stability, capital stock and population growth significantly affect the estimated impact of cognitive skills

14 14 Causality in brief How do we know international differences in test scores reflect school policies and not things like health and nutrition differences in the population or cultural differences? This concern has been addressed by focusing attention just on the variations in achievement that arise directly from institutional characteristics of each country s school system (exit examinations, autonomy, relative teacher salaries and private schooling). When the analysis is limited in this way, the estimation of the growth relationship yields essentially the same results Do changes in test scores over time relate to changes in growth rates? For 12 OECD countries, the magnitude of trends in education performance can be related to the magnitude of trends in growth rates over time. This investigation provides more evidence of the causal influence of cognitive skills.

15 15 Causality in brief What if achievement is simply a reflection of other aspects of the economy and not the driving force in growth? One way to test this is to consider the implications of differences in measured skills within a single economy. This was done by comparing immigrants to the United states who have been educated in their home countries with immigrants educated just in the United states. This comparison finds that the cognitive skills seen in the immigrant s home country lead to higher incomes, but only if the immigrant was in fact educated in the home country. Immigrants from the same home country who are schooled in the United states see no economic return to home country test scores a finding that pinpoints the value of better schools

16 16 16 The high cost of low educational performance What if every 15 year old would at least complete Level 1?

17 1400% 1300% 1200% 1100% 1000% 900% 800% 700% 600% 500% 400% 300% 200% 100% The economic value of improvement Value of improvement in terms of current GDP over working life of today s 15-year-olds 0% Lower middle income countries Upper middle income countries High income non-oecd High income OECD The increase in GDP among high income countries would still exceed total current spending on schooling Baseline skills Full enrolment without increase in quality Baseline skills and full enrolment

18 18 The economic value of improvement

19 % GDP 23,841 bn$ Low mathematics performance Iran* Costa Rica Montenegro BrazilArgentina Tunisia Saudi Arabia* Indonesia Peru Uruguay Bahrain* Georgia* Albania Jordan Macedonia Colombia Qatar Botswana* Oman* Morocco* 1427% GDP 2,459 bn$ Honduras* South Africa* Ghana* 3880% GDP 4,526 bn$ * Substituted from TIMSS 250

20 High mathematics performance Chinese Taipei Singapore Hong Kong-China Korea 86% GDP 402 bn$ Poland Belgium Germany Austria Slovenia New Zealand Denmark 63 bn$ Czech Republic France LuxembourgLatvia Portugal Spain Slovak 153% Republic GDP United States Hungary 101% GDP 27,929 bn$ Israel Macao-China Japan Liechtenstein Switzerland Netherlands Estonia Finland Canada Viet Nam 304% GDP 1,667 bn$ Australia Ireland United Kingdom Iceland Norway Italy Russian Fed. Lithuania Sweden Croatia 38% GDP 209 bn$ Greece Romania Chile Serbia Turkey Bulgaria U.A.E. Kazakhstan Thailand Malaysia Mexico 551% GDP 12,448 bn$ Low mathematics performance

21 High mathematics performance Singapore Chinese Taipei Hong Kong-China Korea Macao-China Japan Liechtenstein Switzerland Strong socio-economic impact on student performance Poland Belgium Germany Austria Slovenia New Zealand Denmark Czech Republic France LuxembourgLatvia Portugal Spain Slovak Republic United States Hungary Israel Netherlands Estonia Finland Canada Viet Nam Australia Ireland United Kingdom Iceland Norway Italy Russian Fed. Lithuania Sweden Croatia Socially equitable distribution of learning opportunities Greece Romania Chile Serbia Turkey Bulgaria U.A.E. Kazakhstan Thailand Malaysia Mexico Low mathematics performance

22 Singapore Chinese Taipei Korea Hong Kong-China Japan Macao-China Switzerland Liechtenstein Netherlands Estonia Poland Belgium Canada Finland Germany Viet Nam Strong socio-economic Denmark Austria Socially equitable New Zealand Australia impact on student Slovenia Ireland distribution of learning Czech Rep. Iceland performance France opportunities 0 UK Luxembourg Latvia Norway Portugal Italy US Russian Fed. Spain Lithuania Slovak Rep. Sweden Hungary Croatia Israel Chile Bulgaria Romania Greece Turkey Serbia United Arab Emirates Malaysia Kazakhstan Thailand Mexico

23 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Strong Israel socio-economic Italy impact on student Japan performance Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands Slovak Rep. New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Netherlands Estonia Poland Belgium Canada Finland Germany Denmark Austria Socially equitable New Zealand Australia Slovenia Ireland distribution of learning Czech Rep. Iceland France opportunities UK Luxembourg Norway Portugal Italy US Spain Sweden Hungary Chile Switzerland Israel Greece Turkey Korea Japan Mexico 2012

24 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US

25 Portugal Spain Switzerland Belgium Korea Luxembourg Germany Greece Japan Australia United Kingdom New Zealand France Netherlands Denmark Italy Austria Czech Republic Hungary Norway Iceland Ireland Mexico Finland Sweden United States Poland Slovak Republic Contribution of various factors to upper secondary teacher compensation costs, per student as a percentage of GDP per capita (2004) Salary as % of GDP/capita Instruction time 1/teaching time 1/class size Difference with OECD average Percentage points

26 26 Behavioural issues equate to lower job satisfaction, class size doesn t Mean mathematics performance, by school location, after acc ounting for socio-economic status Teachers' job satisfaction level following the number of students in the classroom in relation to the percentage of students with behavioural problems Fig II ,0 Average 13,0 Average 12,5 12,5 Teacher job satisfaction (level) 12,0 11,5 11,0 Teacher job satisfaction (level) 12,0 11,5 11,0 10,5 10,5 10,0 10,0 15 or less Class size (number of students) or more None 1% to 10% 11% to 30% Students with behavioural problems 31% or more

27 27 Excellence and equity Excellence and equity are compatible policy goals

28 Excellence and equity Basic skills for all or cultivating top achievers? The impact of the basic skills share does not vary significantly with the initial level of development The impact of the top performing share is significantly larger in countries that have more scope to catch up to the most productive countries (the process of economic convergence is accelerated in countries with larger shares of high performing students).

29 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US

30 Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Israel Italy Japan Korea Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands Slovak Rep. New Zealand Norway Poland Portugal Slovak Rep. Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK US Shanghai Singapore Singapore Korea Japan Switzerland Netherlands Estonia Poland Belgium Canada Finland Germany Denmark Austria New Zealand Australia Slovenia Ireland Czech Rep. Iceland France UK Luxembourg Norway Portugal Italy US Spain Sweden Hungary Israel Chile Turkey 2003 Chile 2003 Greece Turkey Mexico

31 31 Why poverty need not be destiny It s not just about poor kids in poor neighborhoods but about many kids in many neighborhoods The country where students go to class matters more than what social class students come from

32 32 PISA mathematics performance by decile of social background Mexico Chile Greece Norway Sweden Iceland Israel Italy United States Spain Denmark Luxembourg Australia Ireland United Kingdom Hungary Canada Finland Austria Turkey Liechtenstein Czech Republic Estonia Portugal Slovenia Slovak Republic New Zealand Germany Netherlands France Switzerland Poland Belgium Japan Macao-China Hong Kong-China Korea Singapore Chinese Taipei Shanghai-China Source: PISA 2012

33 33 School performance and socio-economic background: Slovenia Student performance and students socio-economic background School performance and schools socio-economic background Student performance and students socio-economic background within schools 700 Private school Public school in rural area Public school in urban area Student performance Disadvantage PISA Index of socio-economic background Advantage

34 Social background principal and students % students from disadvantaged backgrounds the percentage of students with a value of ESCS lower than Serbia Size of bullet represents impact of social background on student performance Spain Singapore Italy Latvia Bulgaria Poland Slovak Republic Japan Korea Estonia Netherlands Norway Iceland Romania Australia Brazil Mexico Portugal France Israel Chile Malaysia United States % principals who reported that more than 30% of their students are from socioeconomically disadvantaged homes

35 35 Educational improvement Making sure skills are put to good use

36 Use of skills at work Most frequent use = 4 2,4 2,2 Index of use 2 1,8 1,6 Average United States Japan 1,4 Reading at Writing at Numeracy at ICT at work Problem Least frequent use = 0 work work work solving at work

37 37 Labour productivity and the use of reading skills at work 4,6 Norway (log) Labour productivity 4,4 4,2 4 3,8 3,6 3,4 3,2 Italy Slovak Republic Poland Ireland Spain Czech Republic Estonia Netherlands Denmark Germany United States Austria Sweden Australia Japan Finland Canada England/N. Ireland (UK) Korea 3 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8 1,9 2 2,1 2,2 2,3 Use of reading skills at work

38 38 Assumptions Obtaining the projected gains will require a variety of structural changes in each country s economy so that the new, more skilled workers can be productively absorbed into the labour force. These changes are assumed to be similar to the productivity improvements seen over past half century Estimated effect of test scores on growth 2,5 2, * 1,84 1, ,94 0,89 0,5 0 Closed economy Open economy Openness to international trade Least protection Most protection Protection against expropriation risk

39 39 39 Educational improvement Learning from good examples

40 40 Must haves High impact on outcomes Quick wins Lessons from high performers Low feasibility Can we make it happen? It s everybody s business High feasibility Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

41 41 Must haves High impact on outcomes Commitment to universal achievement Quick wins Lessons from high performers Capacity at point of delivery Low feasibility Coherence Resources where they yield most A learning system Gateways, instructional systems High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low impact on outcomes Low hanging fruits

42 42 Lessons from high performers Low feasibility High impact on outcomes A commitment Must haves to education and the belief that Quick wins Commitment to universal achievement competencies can be learned and therefore all children can achieve Capacity at Ambitious point of delivery educational standards and Resources personalization as the approach to heterogeneity where in they student yield most body as opposed to a belief that students have different Gateways, instructional destinations to be met with different expectations, and systems selection/stratification as the approach to heterogeneity Coherence A learning system Clear articulation who is responsible for ensuring student success and to whom High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

43 Countries where students have stronger beliefs Fig III in their abilities perform better in mathematics 650 Mean mathematics performance OECD average Shanghai-China Singapore Hong Kong-China Korea Chinese Taipei Japan Macao-China Switzerland NetherlandsEstonia Finland Canada Liechtenstein Belgium Poland Germany Viet Nam Denmark Slovenia New Zealand Latvia Italy Portugal Austria Australia Russian Fed. Hungary Croatia Luxembourg Greece Slovak Republic Spain Turkey Israel Sweden Norway Serbia Lithuania Czech Republic U.A.E. United Kingdom Thailand Malaysia Romania Iceland Chile Bulgaria Kazakhstan Ireland United States Montenegro France Costa Rica Brazil Uruguay Mexico Albania Argentina Tunisia Colombia Qatar Jordan Indonesia Peru R² = ,60-0,40-0,20 0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 Mean index of mathematics self-efficacy

44 44 Perceived self-responsibility for failure in mathematics Fig III.3.6 Percentage of students who reported "agree" or "strongly agree" with the following statements: Slovenia Shanghai-China OECD average Sometimes I am just unlucky The teacher did not get students interested in the material Sometimes the course material is too hard This week I made bad guesses on the quiz My teacher did not explain the concepts well this week I m not very good at solving mathematics problems %

45 Greater self-efficacy among girls could shrink the gender gap in mathematics Fig III performance, particularly among the highest-performing students Gender gap among the highest-achieving students (90th percentile) 40 Gender gap adjusted for differences in mathematics self-efficacy between boys and girls Gender gap Boys do better Girls do better VS4-20 Colombia Costa Rica Peru Israel Luxembourg Chile Tunisia Slovak Republic Liechtenstein Italy Korea Spain Argentina Brazil Portugal Greece Japan Austria Uruguay Mexico Hong Kong-China Bulgaria Turkey Indonesia Hungary Viet Nam United States Romania U.A.E. Chinese Taipei Canada Ireland Belgium Kazakhstan Czech Republic OECD average Croatia France Shanghai-China Montenegro Poland Serbia Malaysia Estonia Qatar Macao-China Netherlands New Zealand Norway Lithuania Slovenia Denmark Jordan Switzerland Australia Germany Latvia Russian Fed. Sweden Singapore United Kingdom Thailand Finland Iceland Score-point difference (boys-girls) B

46 Diapozitiv 45 VS4 VAYSSETTES Sophie 14-Nov-2013 Add 2 boxes to indicate what we see above the horizont axix and what we see below VAYSSETTES Sophie;

47 Percentage of girls and boys who intend to take additional mathematics, rather than language, courses after they leave school Girls Boys Turkey Jordan * Costa Rica * Thailand Kazakhstan * Iceland Shanghai-China * Viet Nam Albania * United Arab Emirates * Qatar Malaysia * Norway Israel Cyprus Indonesia * Portugal * Colombia Japan Netherlands Croatia Latvia Uruguay Argentina Denmark Peru Mexico Tunisia Estonia Chile Liechtenstein Macao-China Poland Luxembourg France Spain Italy Sweden Belgium United States Czech Republic Chinese Taipei Singapore OECD average Slovenia Canada Greece Lithuania Bulgaria Switzerland Finland United Kingdom Slovak Republic Romania Russian Federation Austria Montenegro Brazil Ireland Germany Hong Kong-China Australia New Zealand Serbia Korea Hungary %

48 47 Lessons from high performers Low feasibility Must haves Capacity at point of delivery Coherence High impact on outcomes Commitment to universal achievement Quick wins Clear ambitious goals that are shared across the system and aligned with Resources high stakes gateways and instructional systems where they yield most Well established delivery chain Gateways, through instructional which curricular goals translate into instructional systems systems, instructional practices and student learning (intended, implemented and A learning achieved) system High level of metacognitive content of instruction High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

49 48 Capacity at the point of delivery Lessons from high performers Low feasibility High impact on outcomes Must haves Quick wins Attracting, developing and retaining high quality teachers and school Commitment leaders and to a work universal organisation achievement in which they can use their potential Capacity Instructional leadership and human resource at point of delivery Resources management in schools where they yield most Keeping teaching an attractive profession System wide career development Coherence A learning system Gateways, instructional systems High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

50 Mean mathematics performance, by school location, after acc ounting for socio-economic status 49 Capacity at the point of delivery Improve the societal view of teaching as a profession Recruit top candidates into the profession Developing Teaching as a profession Retain and recognise effective teachers path for growth Support teachers in continued development of practice

51 Mean mathematics performance, by school location, after accounting for socio-economic status 50 Teachers' perceptions of the value of teaching Fig II.3.3 Percentage of lower secondary teachers who "agree" or "strongly agree" that teaching profession is a valued profession in society Malaysia Singapore Korea Abu Dhabi (UAE) Finland Mexico Alberta (Canada) Flanders (Belgium) Netherlands Australia England (UK) Romania Israel United States Chile Average Norway Japan Latvia Serbia Bulgaria Denmark Poland Iceland Estonia Brazil Italy Czech Republic Portugal Croatia Spain Sweden France Percentage of teachers Slovak Republic Above-average performers in PISA

52 51 Countries Mean mathematics where teachers performance, believe by school their profession location, is valued show after higher accounting levels of for student socio-economic achievement status Fig II.3.3 Relationship between lower secondary teachers' views on the value of their profession in society and the country s share of top mathematics performers in PISA Singapore Share of mathematics top performers Poland Estonia France Australia Czech Republic England (UK) Slovak Republic Italy Iceland Portugal Norway Israel Sweden Spain Denmark Latvia United States Croatia Serbia Bulgaria Romania Chile Brazil Korea Flanders (Belgium) Japan R 2 = 0.24 r= 0.49 Netherlands Alberta (Canada) Finland Mexico Percentage of teachers who agree that teaching is valued in society

53 Teacher skills and graduate skills (numeracy) Japan Finland Flanders (Belgium) Germany Norway Netherlands Austria Czech Republic Sweden Australia France Slovak Republic Northern Ireland (UK) Denmark England/N. Ireland (UK) England (UK) Korea Ireland Canada United States Estonia Poland Italy Middle half of the numeracy skill distribution of graduates (16-65 years) PIAAC test scores (numeracy)

54 Teacher skills and graduate skills (numeracy) Japan Finland Flanders (Belgium) Germany Norway Netherlands Austria Czech Republic Sweden Australia France Slovak Republic Northern Ireland (UK) Denmark England/N. Ireland (UK) England (UK) Korea Ireland Canada United States Estonia Poland Italy Middle half of the numeracy skill distribution of graduates (16-65 years) Numeracy skills of teachers PIAAC test scores (numeracy)

55 Mean mathematics performance, by school location, 54 Teachers after accounting Self-Efficacy for socio-economic and Professional status Collaboration Fig II ,40 13,20 Teach jointly as a 13,00 team in the same class 12,80 12,60 12,40 12,20 12,00 11,80 11,60 11,40 Never Once a year or less 2-4 times a year 5-10 times a year 1-3 times a month Once a week or more Teacher self-efficacy (level) Observe other teachers classes and provide feedback Engage in joint activities across different classes Take part in collaborative professional learning

56 Exchange and co-ordination Professional collaboration Discuss individual students Share resources Team conferences Collaborate for common standards Team teaching Collaborative PD Joint activities Percentage of teachers Classroom observations 55 Teacher co-operation Percentage of lower secondary teachers who report doing the following activities at least once per month Average

57 56 Lessons from high performers Must haves High impact on outcomes Commitment to universal achievement Aligned incentive structures Quick wins Incentives, accountability, knowledge management Capacity For students at point of How delivery gateways affect the strength, direction, Resources clarity and nature of the incentives operating on students where at each they stage yield of their most education Degree to which students have incentives to take tough courses and study hard Opportunity costs for staying in school and performing Gateways, well instructional For teachers systems Coherence Make innovations in pedagogy and/or organisation A learning system Improve their own performance and the performance of their colleagues Low feasibility High feasibility Pursue professional development opportunities that lead to stronger pedagogical practices Incentive structures and A balance between vertical and lateral accountability accountability Effective instruments to manage and share knowledge and spread innovation communication within the system and with stakeholders around it Money pits Low hanging fruits A capable centre with authority and legitimacy to act Low impact on outcomes

58 57 57 Aligning autonomy with accountability Lessons from high performers

59 58 58 Countries that grant schools autonomy over curricula and assessments tend to perform better in mathematics Lessons from high performers Mathematics performance (score points) Shanghai-China Chinese Taipei Viet Nam Korea Singapore Estonia Hong Kong-China Japan Latvia Poland Slovenia Czech Rep. Switzerland Belgium Canada Portugal Germany Finland New Zealand Lithuania Croatia Austria Hungary Netherlands Serbia Spain France Australia Italy UK Turkey Norway Macao-China Greece Bulgaria Denmark Iceland Thailand Kazakhstan Romania Slovak Rep. R² = 0,13 Israel Malaysia Uruguay USA Sweden Chile Jordan Costa Rica Brazil Indonesia Luxembourg Tunisia Albania Colombia UAE Argentina Peru Qatar 300-1,5-1 -0,5 0 0,5 1 1,5 Index of school responsibility for curriculum and assessment (index points) 58 Source: PISA 2012

60 Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with standardised math policies Fig IV.1.16 School autonomy for curriculum and assessment x system's extent of implementing a standardised math policy (e.g. curriculum and instructional materials) Score points Less school autonomy Shared math policy No shared math policy More school autonomy

61 Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with more accountability arrangements Fig IV.1.16 School autonomy for curriculum and assessment x system's level of posting achievement data publicly Score points School data public Less school autonomy School data not public More school autonomy

62 Schools with more autonomy perform better than schools with less autonomy in systems with more collaboration Fig IV.1.17 School autonomy for resource allocation x System's level of teachers participating in school management Across all participating countries and economies 485 Score points Less school autonomy Teachers participate in management Teachers don't participate in management More school autonomy

63 62 Quality assurance and school improvement Fig IV.4.14 Percentage of students in schools whose principal reported that their schools have the following for quality assurance and improvement: Slovenia Singapore OECD average Implementation of a standardised policy for mathematics Regular consultation with one or more experts over a period of at least six months with the aim of improving Teacher mentoring Written feedback from students (e.g. regarding lessons, teachers or resources) External evaluation Internal evaluation/self-evaluation Systematic recording of data, including teacher and student attendance and graduation rates, test results Written specification of student-performance standards Written specification of the school's curriculum and educational goals %

64 63 Lessons from high performers Low feasibility Must haves High impact on outcomes Commitment to universal achievement Quick wins Investing resources where they can make most of a difference Capacity at point of delivery Alignment of resources Resources with key challenges (e.g. attracting the most where talented they yield teachers mostto the most challenging classrooms) Gateways, instructional Effective spending choices that prioritise high quality systems teachers over smaller classes Coherence A learning system High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

65 64 Must haves High impact on outcomes Commitment to universal achievement Quick wins Lessons from high performers Capacity at point of delivery Coherence of policies and practices Alignment of policies across all aspects of the system Coherence Coherence of policies over sustained periods of time Low feasibility Consistency of implementation Fidelity of implementation (without excessive control) Resources where they yield most A learning system Gateways, instructional systems High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low hanging fruits Low impact on outcomes

66 65 Must haves High impact on outcomes Commitment to universal achievement Quick wins Lessons from high performers Capacity at point of delivery Low feasibility Coherence Resources where they yield most A learning system Gateways, instructional systems High feasibility Incentive structures and accountability Money pits Low impact on outcomes Low hanging fruits

67 66 Lessons from high performers Average school systems Some students learn at high levels High performers in PISA All students learn at high levels Uniformity Embracing diversity Curriculum centred Learner centred Learning a place Learning an activity Prescription Informed profession

68 67 What it all means The old bureaucratic system Student inclusion The modern enabling system Lessons from high performers Some students learn at high levels Routine cognitive skills Standardisation and compliance Tayloristic, hierarchical Curriculum, instruction and assessment Teacher quality Work organisation All students need to learn at high levels Conceptual understanding, complex ways of thinking, ways of working High level professional knowledge workers Flat, collegial Primarily to authorities Accountability Primarily to peers and stakeholders

69 68 Reform challenges Reforms that bypass the classroom Insufficient investment in capacity Insufficient attention to context

70 69 Elements of success Focus on the instructional core Focus on leadership and teacher capacity Policy alignment Understanding and engaging stakeholders

71 70 70 Thank you Lessons from high performers Find out more about this report at basic skills en.htm #UniversalBasicSkills Twitter: SchleicherEDU and remember: Without data, you are just another person with an opinion 70